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“For the message of the cross is foolishness to those who are perishing, but to us 
who are being saved it is the power of God. For it is written: I will destroy the 
wisdom of the wise; the intelligence of the intelligent I will frustrate.  For the 
foolishness of God is wiser than man’s wisdom, and the weakness of God is stronger 
than man’s strength.” 




“Peace is not an absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for 
benevolence, confidence, justice”. 




“The real and lasting victories are those of peace and not of war”. 
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The study investigates the political economy of development in post-conflict 
Mozambique. This study is written from the theoretical perspectives of growing 
criticism of the Washington Consensus policies on developing nations, which place 
economic growth and development within the field of development studies as they are 
played out in African realities. This study takes cognisance of the structural 
underpinnings in Mozambique. The country emerged from a series of protracted 
brutal wars (independence from Portugal 1965-1975; Civil War 1975-1992), which 
undermined developmental initiatives under the period of socialist central planning, 
curtailed global competitiveness, and inhibited nation-building.  
 
Mozambique is viewed by the donor community and multilateral institutions, 
such as the World Bank and IMF, as a success story of post-war construction and is 
used as a model to be emulated. The study proposes a thesis that, contrary to the 
common belief of donors and International Financial Institutions (IFIs), adjustment 
policies do harm to this poor economy. Furthermore, neo-liberal economic policies 
have altered the role of state institutions, not eliminating state power, but redirecting 
it. This claim challenges the neo-liberal claim that Mozambique‟s post-conflict 
political economy has been “revolutionary”. Economic reforms can, by and large, 
benefit this economy, but alone, are insufficient to reduce poverty and economic 
dependence. 
 
 Secondary quantitative data was made available from leading international 
organisation such as WHO, FAO and TI. The study found that, despite improvements 
in reducing the number of people living in poverty between 1992 and 2008, 
malnutrition, diseases such as malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, and corruption are 
on the increase. This demystifies claims that Mozambique is a post-conflict success 
story. The author concludes that global governance reforms that take cognisance of 
Mozambique and Africa‟s political crisis are needed to forge a post-colonial 
development paradigm relevant for Africa. This can only be achieved if global 
capitalism is radically transformed, specifically with a move toward increasing the 
voices of the global South; to attain the economic freedom that is desperately needed. 
vi 
ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ARA   Accao Revolutionaria Armada  
 
BWI  Bretton Woods Institutions, viz., the World Bank and IMF, 
founded at Bretton Woods  
 
COMECOM  Council for Mutual Economic Assistance   
 
ERP    Economic Rehabilitation Programme  
 
FAO   Food and Agricultural Organisation  
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FRELIMO Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Front for the Liberation 
of Mozambique)  
 
GFTAM   Global Fund to Fight Against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria  
GNI   Gross National Income  
GPA   General Peace Agreement  
 
 
HIV/AIDS  Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome 
IFIs   International Financial Institutions 
IMF    International Monetary Fund 
 
MCA  Millennium Challenge Account 
 
ODA   Official Development Assistance  
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
ONUMOZ  UN Operation in Mozambique (Spanish Acronym) 
OVC   Orphans and Vulnerable Children  
 
vii 
PARPA II Plano doe Accao para a Reducao da Probleza Absoluta, Action 
Plan to Reduce Absolute Poverty—Mozambique‟s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy   
PCP   Portuguese Communist Party  
PEPFAR  President‟s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief  
PLHIV   People Living with HIV 
PPI   Plano Perspectivo Indicativo (Indicative Perspective Plan)  
PRE   Programa de Reabilitacao Economica, Economic Rehabilitation 
   Programme 
 
RENAMO Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (National Resistance 
Movement of  Mozambique) 
 
SAP  Structural Adjustment Programme  
SoE  State owned Enterprise  
 
TB   Tuberculosis   
TI   Transparency International  
 
UN    United Nations 
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme     
UNICEF   United Nations Children‟s Fund 
US   United States of America 
USSR   Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
 
WFP    World Food Programme  
WHO   World Health Organisation 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DECLARATION .................................................................................................................................... I 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................ III 
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................................... V 
ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................................VI 
 
CHAPTER ONE : MOZAMBIQUE‟S POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL ECONOMY: 
“AFRICA‟S SUCCESS STORY”?  
1.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND QUESTIONS: MOZAMBIQUE‟S DEVELOPMENT PATH FROM 
INDEPENDENCE TO DEMOCRACY .................................................................................................... 2 
1.3. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH. ................................................................................... 7 
1.4. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS ..................................................................... 7 
1.5. METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................... 15 
1.5.1. Discussion of Methodology: Limitations of Study ............................................................... 15 
1.6. ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY .................................................................................................... 17 
 
CHAPTER TWO : MOZAMBIQUE‟S POLITICAL-ECONOMY: FROM COLONIALISM TO 
POST-COLONIALISM 
2.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 19 
2.1.1. Mozambique’s Colonial History: 1500s to 1975 ................................................................ 19 
2.1.2. FRELIMO and ‘The New Man’ ........................................................................................... 25 
2.1.3. Mozambique’s Post Colonial Political Economy―1975 to 1986 ....................................... 28 
2.2. THE CIVIL WAR―1977 TO 1992 ................................................................................................. 33 
2.2.1 Foreign Relations Under the Machel Regime ...................................................................... 36 
2.3 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................................ 41 
 
ix 
CHAPTER THREE : MOZAMBIQUE‟S POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL ECONOMY: 
PROGRESS IN AN ERA OF NEO-LIBERALISM (19922009)  
3.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 43 
3.1.1 Post-Conflict Political Transformation: The Tortuous Road to Democratisation 
(19922002) .................................................................................................................................. 44 
3.1.2. Democratisation: Towards Consolidation (20022009) .................................................... 47 
3.2. THEORETICAL CONTESTATIONS: LOCATING MOZAMBIQUE IN THE DEBATES OF NEO-LIBERALISM
 ..................................................................................................................................................... 50 
3.2.1. The case of Mozambique ..................................................................................................... 56 
3.2.2.  Mozambique’s Post-conflict Economic Growth ................................................................. 57 
3.2.3. Aid Dependency .................................................................................................................. 58 
3.3. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 61 
 
CHAPTER FOUR : DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION 
4.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 62 
4.1.1. DATA ........................................................................................................................................ 62 
4.1.2. MEASURING DEVELOPMENT ..................................................................................................... 65 
4.2. PRESENTATION OF DATA ............................................................................................................. 66 
4.2.1. Economic Growth and FDI ................................................................................................. 66 
4.2.2. Mozambique’s Food Security Success Story? ..................................................................... 68 
4.2.3. Mozambique’s Human Development .................................................................................. 74 
4.2.4. Poverty and Economic Development .................................................................................. 79 
4.2.5. Governance in Mozambique: Corruption ........................................................................... 82 
4.2.5. Key Findings ....................................................................................................................... 84 
4.3. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 86 
 
CHAPTER FIVE : CONCLUSION--MOZAMBIQUE‟S POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL 
ECONOMY: “AFRICA‟S SUCCESS STORY”?  
5.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................ 87 
5.1.1. Mozambique: Development in an era of Neo-liberalism? .................................................. 88 
 
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 96 
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1: MOZAMBIQUE’S ANNUAL GDP GROWTH (19922006) .................................................................... 67 
 
FIGURE 2: MOZAMBIQUE’S FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT-NET FLOWS (1992-2006) ............................................ 67 
 
FIGURE 3: MOZAMBIQUE’S TOTAL CEREAL PRODUCTION FROM 1992-2007 ......................................................... 68 
 
FIGURE 4: MOZAMBIQUE’S FOOD AID RECEIVED FROM 1992 TO 2006. ............................................................... 69 
 
FIGURE 5:  MOZAMBIQUE’S HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX (1980-2007) ............................................................ 75 
 
FIGURE 6: MOZAMBIQUE’S PUBLIC HEALTH EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENT OF GDP (20012006) ............................. 76 
 
FIGURE 7: MOZAMBIQUE’S TUBERCULOSIS INCIDENCE RATE (1992-2006) ........................................................... 77 
 
FIGURE 8: MOZAMBIQUE’S REPORTED MALARIA CASES (1996-2007) ................................................................. 78 
 
FIGURE 9: MOZAMBIQUE’S ORPHANS DUE TO HIV/AIDS (2001-2007)............................................................... 79 
 
FIGURE 10: OECD’S AID TO MOZAMBIQUE FROM 1980 TO 2008 ....................................................................... 81 
 
FIGURE 11: MOZAMBIQUE’S CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX ............................................................................ 83 
 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
TABLE 1: MOZAMBIQUE’S CHILDREN’S HEALTH INDICATORS OVER A PERIOD OF TIME .............................................. 71 
 
TABLE 2: MOZAMBIQUE’S NUTRITION LEVELS ................................................................................................... 72 
 







MOZAMBIQUE‟S POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL 
ECONOMY: “AFRICA‟S SUCCESS STORY”? 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
This study aims to critically analyse the political economy of development in 
post-colonial Mozambique (1975-2008).The study questions the growing consensus 
that Mozambique is “an African success story” that has come about since the 
inception of political and economic reforms in the post-conflict era. The study will 
delve into the political economy of Mozambique between 1975 and 1986 as a 
background to understanding post-conflict political economy dilemmas. Following the 
victory of Samora Machel against Portuguese colonialism in 1975, complete 
transformation of a distorted colonial economy was what the liberation movement, 
Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), set out to achieve after 
independence. FRELIMO pursued policies that were couched in the principles of the 
„New Man‟ which were an antidote to the colonialist‟s political, social and economic 
relations. The New Man followed a period of pragmatic state action, uncertain social 
relations and genuine idealism. Coupled with that, the revolution faced an internal 
backlash as civil war with the rebel movement, RENAMO (Resistencia Nacional 
Mocambicana; National Resistance Movement of Mozambique), ensued.  
 
Since the signing of the 1992 General Peace Agreement (GPA) between 
FRELIMO and RENAMO, Mozambique has been regarded by international policy 
makers and commentators as a “beacon of hope” and a “model” that can be emulated 
in post-conflict societies across the world. These suggestions have been made after 
experimentation with political and economic reforms under the auspices of 
international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. The results of these 
reforms are also noted by several unilateral and multilateral agencies and 
organisations.  
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For example, a UN report suggests that: 
 
Mozambique has become one of Africa‟s most successful stories of post war 
reconstruction and economic recovery. The country had its third peaceful democratic, 
legislative and presidential elections in December 2004, reaffirming the commitment 
to political stability and national reconciliation. Mozambique has engaged in an 
ambitious economic, social and political reform agenda, and has made efforts to 
consolidate macroeconomic stability (2005: 7).  
 
In the post-conflict phase, consensus in the donor community is that 
Mozambique should commit itself to human rights and to a free market, uphold the 
rule of law, be fair to political processes, train the workforce, give education to the 
young, bring succour to the suffering poor, and observe gender equality and the rights 
of minorities. The African Development Bank further suggests that Mozambique  
 
…has enjoyed impressive economic growth averaging 7% in the past ten years, and 
sustained macroeconomic and political stability. Growth has been driven mainly by 
investments in mineral resources, industry, services, policy reform, pro-poor 
government expenditure and strong donor support… (2008).  
 
1.2. Research Problem and Questions: Mozambique‟s Development 
Path from Independence to Democracy  
 
In ushering in the policies of the „New Man‟ FRELIMO consolidated a 
national programme that was based on three tenets: modernisation, socialism and 
nationalism. Thus, FRELIMO had embarked on an ambitious political project to 
socially-engineer Mozambican society. As several scholars have argued, the 
establishment of a material and ideological basis for a socialist society became an 
overall goal, and emphasis was laid on the role of the state in savings, investment, 
production and trade (Saul, 1985; Mittleman, 1981; Pitcher, 2002). FRELIMO‟s 
political project sought to dismantle the colonial economic base through rapid 
industrialisation based on agricultural surplus. However, Tarp and Igel Lau have 
argued that “a bloody war and a range of deep-seated structural problems inherited 
from the colonial era helped to pave the way to economic collapse” (1998: 288). 
Advances and attacks launched by RENAMO, a rebel movement initially recruited by 
the Rhodesian government of Ian Smith to destabilise the FRELIMO government, 
was thus a contributing factor to the moribund economy.  
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The FRELIMO government increased military expenditure at the expense of 
radically transforming the inherited colonial economy and meeting development 
indicators like healthcare and school enrolment. Economic policies pursued by 
FRELIMO resulted in further deterioration of the economy. For example, 
Abrahamsson and Nilsson note that state farming stagnated, despite massive 
investments; fifty percent of the land that had been cultivated commercially during the 
colonial era had not been put to use (1995: 49). This led to the demise of socialist 
central planning, and a move towards market capitalism seemed inevitable. Tarp and 
Igel Lau point out that the ensuing economic policies resulted in the implementation 
of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) the Economic Rehabilitation 
Programme (ERP), which was launched in 1987 with the assistance of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (1998: 289).  
 
Fifteen years after the war of destablisation, the peace has held. Mozambique 
is the donors' “model pupil”, carefully following their prescriptions, and total aid 
received has risen unabated in the post-conflict phase. The highest recorded was in 
2008 when total aid given reached almost US$2 billion. The Millennium 
Development Report noted: 
 
International development assistance plays a crucial role in Mozambique‟s fight 
against poverty. Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) averaged US$1.1 
billion in the period 1997-2003, around 31.4 percent of GNI or US$61.8 per capita in 
the same period (2005: 12).  
 
However higher levels of growth accompanied by aid dependency have 
brought about conflicting results. A World Bank report notes that, from the human 
development perspective, growth has meant a 40 percent decrease in infant and under-
five mortality, and a 76 percent increase in net primary school enrolment. A closer 
examination would indicate that there was an improvement between 1997-2003, 
however, the PARPA II report suggests the mortality rate among children under five 
is still close to the average for less-developed countries, which stood at 160 in 2001 
(PARPA II, 2006). Although the 2005 data seem to show improvements, as the infant 
mortality rate per 1000 live birth declined to 100 (UNDP, Human Development 
Report, 2005), children between 624 months are the most vulnerable to malnutrition 
because that is when they start eating solid food.  
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PARPA II further reports that, following technical adjustments of data, results 
indicate that the prevalence of malnutrition among children fell between 1996/97 and 
2003 (PARPA II, 2006: 12). However, the report further suggests that,  
 
in comparisons with the gains made in consumption, those improvements in the 
prevalence of malnutrition among children seem minor and are sometimes not 
statistically significant (PARPA II, 2006: 12-13).  
 
In the same period that impressive growth was achieved, HIV/AIDS has been 
on the increase and several discrepancies have been noted. The Mozambique National 
Human Development Report has noted that there were massive movements of people 
and return of refugees and internally displaced people to the country and zones of 
their origin. This trend has led to a rapid increase of HIV and AIDS, but as yet there 
are no surveillance systems nor appropriate and directed prevention campaigns (2007: 
15). The severity of the disease has led to an increased number of Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children (OVCs). Socially, the tension is further exacerbated as the 
actively working population (both men and women) have been hard hit by the 
pandemic, depleting labour that is required to build the economy. Economic growth 
tension has been skewed when social indicators are taken into consideration. A UN 
Report notes the following:  
 
[I]nequality has increased as the Gini coefficient rose from 0.40 in 1997 to 0.42 in 
2005—and the consumption of the poor grew slower, in percentage terms, than that 
of the rich (2005: 12).  
 
The World Food Programme (WFP, 2010) reports that “Mozambique is one of 
the poorest countries in the world, ranked 172 out of 177 countries on the 2007/2008 
Human Development Index” (2007)
1
. Furthermore, a baseline study notes that “[o]n 
average, 35 percent of households in Mozambique are considered chronically food 
insecure (Baseline Study of the National Secretariat for Food Security and Nutrition, 
2006). According to the most recent assessment, the provinces with the highest rate of 
chronic food insecurity were Zambezia (36 percent), Tete (35 percent), Maputo (34 
percent) and Inhambane (30 percent). Regional discrepancies are evident with Maputo 




and Maputo city strategically positioned as the darling destinations of Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) and the country‟s economic powerhouse.  
 
The data confirm the assumptions that were made by the PARPA II report. 
The report notes that, with regard to access to private goods and services, such as 
access to modern lighting, a source of potable water and improved sanitation systems, 
better housing and possession of durable goods, Maputo and Tete are the provinces 
that have exhibited the highest percentage of improvement (PARPA II, 2006: 18). 
This contradicts what international policy makers such as the World Bank and the 
African Development Bank have suggested, namely, that political and economic 
reforms have been transformational. The government of Mozambique notes that 54 
percent of the population lives below the national poverty line, 63 percent of rural 
children live in absolute poverty, and 34 percent of households are food insecure and 
face perpetual hunger (Reported on the WFP website). As the WFP clearly suggests: 
 
Mozambique‟s urban population is growing and is expected to exceed 50 percent by 
2025. School enrolment rates are as high as 95 percent for the first level of primary 
education, but they drop drastically to 13 percent for primary grades 6-7. Equally 
telling are primary school completion rates: 76 percent for grades 1-5 and only 35 
percent for grades 67. The vast majority of rural and peri-urban families find it 
difficult to lose their children‟s contribution to the family labor pool by sending them 
to school, so many children enroll at the beginning of the year, but are forced to drop 
out and miss classes in order to help with family chores. As a result, Mozambique‟s 
overall development is hindered by a lack of human resource capacity. 
 
The 2007 World Development Indicators suggested that aid as a percentage of 
GNI decreased by 19 percent between 2000 and 2005, however, in the same period 
aid as a percentage of gross capital formation increased by 28 percent (2007: 349). 
The Millennium Development report suggests that:  
 
the poverty gap ratio registered an improvement—from 29.3 percent in 1997 to 20.5 
percent in 2003—indicating that the households that remained poor during this period 
were, on average, closer (20.5 percent below) to reaching the minimum consumption 
level (poverty line)  (2005: 12).  
 
Growth and the success in post-conflict Mozambique thus merit a closer 
examination. Jones has argued that, despite a dearth of reliable data regarding the real 
volume of additional funding that can be attributed to newer donors, there are 
indications that the volume of new financing may be significant (2009: 18). Recent 
figures suggest that in 2007 alone, Mozambique received US$ 162 million of 
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PEPFAR (President‟s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) funds, which is equal to 
around half the health sector‟s entire 2008 budget (GRM, 2007). Similarly, US$ 500 
million has been committed by the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) to 
Mozambique over five years from 2008, and commitments from the Global Fund to 
Fight Against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) in 2008 were equal to 
around US$ 58 million. In relation to new avenues of aid regimes, Jones suggests the 
following:  
 
[T]hese include the resurgence of non-DAC donors such as China, Brazil and India 
as well as the emergence of various „vertical funds‟, which can be defined as 
international initiatives organised outside the UN system focused on specific 
thematic objectives such as HIV/AIDS and education (2009: 18).  
 
As noble as the tasks stated above seem, this study questions whether the 
acclaimed growth has led to equity and an improvement of the quality of life for the 
majority of citizens in Mozambique. This argument is rooted in questioning the 
current status quo of development and global capitalism. In post-colonial Africa 
Western donor countries saw the need to provide succour to underdeveloped the 
newly independent states. Development policies that have been designed have 
continued to be influenced by Western models, packaged to suit the African situation. 
In this light, development becomes a tool of neo-colonialism. However, 
Mozambique‟s political economy cannot be narrated solely through the lenses of neo-
colonialism. The effects are however, real.  
 
However, Francisco and Connerley, in a comprehensive analysis, conclude 
that “experience in Mozambique suggests that international assistance should 
emphasise economic and political liberalization during, and for several years after, a 
peace settlement” (2005: 218). Francisco and Connerley make suggestions that 
transformational development can be achieved under a neo-liberal regime. They 
suggest that “neither FRELIMO nor RENAMO has understood or appreciated the 
benefits of genuine political and economic liberalization” (2005: 218). This claim 
therefore suggests that, through austere economic policies under the haze of increased 
international involvement in Mozambique, neo-liberalism is the viable alternative to 
usher in growth and equity. However, the results are at best mixed, and the study 
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seeks to critically analyse key assumptions of both donors and the Mozambican 
government, by posing the following key questions:  
 
i. Is Mozambique a successful post-conflict success story after political and 
economic reforms implemented in the post-conflict phase (1992 to 2008)? 
 
ii. Has economic growth in the post-conflict phase been pro-poor in 
Mozambique?   
 
1.3. Aims and Objectives of the Research. 
 
The main aim of the research is to analyse and illustrate, with data, that 
Mozambique is not a post-conflict success story. To achieve this objective the 
following need to be highlighted:  
 
i. To clearly illustrate that despite post-conflict political and economic reforms a 
move toward a market society has not had a revolutionary impact on 
Mozambique‟s development path. 
  
ii. To clearly illustrate with data that higher levels of economic growth have been 
accompanied by rising inequalities, malnutrition, hunger and diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis and aid dependence.  
 
1.4. Theoretical and Conceptual Considerations   
 
In this study, the case of Mozambique is situated within the broader 
development debates of Africa which are characterised by two polarised conceptual 
frameworks, namely, capitalist development and an alternative growth path for the 
continent. Hyden has argued that Africa‟s development malaise can be equated to the 
failure of African countries to implement the principles of a free-market economy. In 
his early work, Hyden suggested that capitalism is much more than what is seen in 
Africa as its most distinct features. The paradox of the capitalist system, as argued by 
Hyden, is that, although it assigns a more limited role to the state economy than 
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socialism does, it is at least as effective in generating, and maintaining, a value 
orientation which enhances the public realm (1983: 24). Hyden thus sees capitalist 
development in Africa as the most effective system to usher in revolutionary change 
coupled with the emergence of a social class strong enough to compete with 
international capital. He argues that despite capitalism‟s shortcomings, capitalism is 
more likely than socialism to hold the key to development in Africa over the decades 
to come, by presupposing a thorough transformation of the peasant mode of 
production (Hyden, 1983: 25). 
 
On the contrary, Hamza Alavi‟s analysis of peripheral capitalism and its 
impact on developing societies suggests that capitalism carries the seeds of its own 
destruction. Following Marxian thinking, Alavi argues that “capitalist production and 
exchange presupposes a kind of equality in society and a basic inequality” (1983: 
292). This inherent contradiction in the capitalist framework is an impediment to 
developing societies, as global structures have not been altered to work favourably for 
developing societies. Alavi further argues that   
 
[c]apitalism is not transcended as long as the state guarantees the continuity of the 
capitalist social relations of production and its class structure by virtue of capitalist 
property that separates the producer from the means of production by interposing 
between them an exploiting class (1983: 295).  
 
The debate between the „virtues of capitalism‟ and socialism as an alternative 
path should be located within a greater appreciation of the historical circumstances 
within which development in Africa is being proposed. This study identifies with the 
latter. Nearly five decades after independence, some theorists argue that much of 
Africa has failed to achieve development. For example, in a very comprehensive 
analysis, Ake has argued that “development has failed as it was never really on the 
agenda in the first place” (1996: 1). The political project that was adopted maintained 
the colonial practice of repression at the expense of transforming newly-independent 
states. Post-colonial Nationalist governments, albeit with insightful visions to 
transform the newly-independent states, failed to articulate the development agenda. 
Ake further suggests that “political conditions in Africa are the greatest impediment to 
development” (1996: 1). Political expediency is deeply entrenched in Africa‟s 
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political thought, and, to a larger extent, politics has failed to bring about principles of 
justice, fairness and equality in the public realm.  
 
Western leaders, policy-makers and commentators have all argued that Africa 
is equated with collapsed or failed states, civil unrest which has led to increased 
migrations, corruption, endemic war and violence, loss of political direction and 
unconstitutional attainments of power, widespread crime, unemployment and social 
anomie. For example, Tony Blair suggested that „[t]he state of Africa is a scar on the 
conscience of the world‟. Armed with an idealism to relieve Africa of this tragic 
history, Blair furthermore suggested that, „if the world focused on Africa, we could 
heal it; and if we do not, the scar will become angrier still‟ (2001: 1). Some theorists 
have poignantly argued that “for most Africans, independence has been more of a 
desperate struggle for survival rather than a steady path to development” 
(Houngnikpo, 2006: 4). 
 
With the benefit of historical hindsight, the Scramble for Africa at the Berlin 
Conference (1884-85) determined the curse of the nation-state, as it led to the 
annexation of African territories by European powers. To drive this point home: 
colonialism crafted the idea of Africa. As Ake has suggested: “[T]he power of the 
colonial state was not only absolute but arbitrary … its officials showed hardly any 
interest in transforming domination into hegemony, beyond the notion that their 
domination was also a civilizing mission” (1996: 3). Through force and coercion the 
colonial state crafted the arbitrary distinctions of citizen and subject. Political and 
civil liberties were curtailed. The political institutions that were developed sought to 
guard Western “progressive” values and caused Africans to be subject to Europeans. 
Economically, the colonial economy, in which production sought to incorporate the 
colonies into the expanding mercantile global capitalist system, was under the 
auspices of the colonisers. As Ake further suggests, these “two features of state 
power, its absolutism and arbitrariness, framed colonial politics” (1996: 3).  
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The post-colonial elite inherited a system that was not designed to work. The 
new system was torn between adopting norms that had governed pre-colonial societies 
and a colonial inheritance which guarded the interests of the colonisers within the 
ambits of new states. Paralysed by the inabilities of weak bureaucracy and unrealistic 
ambitions to embark on a path of modernisation, the political and economic 
machinery that emerged looked like that of its predecessors. Several scholars, such as 
Fanon, Ake and Amin, with every prophetic insight, concluded that the colonial 
regime was thus replaced by a post-colonial African state and elite that were woven 
with the garments of the colonisers. As Ake has lamented: “[A]lthough political 
independence brought some change to the composition of state managers, the 
character of the state remained as much as it was in the colonial era” (1996: 3).  
  
The liberal English historian Meredith notes that “by the mid-1980s most 
Africans were poorer than they had been at the time of independence” (2004: 367). 
There was a failure to cut the umbilical cord with their colonial masters. This was 
reflected in the bilateral trade and diplomatic relations that African countries 
strategically forged with their former predecessors soon after the demise of the 
colonial regimes. The newly-independent African states relied on agricultural raw 
materials and mineral produce to export on the global commodity market. For 
example, Ghana‟s cocoa exports boomed between 1960 and 1970 (Cooper, 2002). In 
similar vein, Zambia‟s copper supplied the bourgeoning global demand (Cooper, 
2002).   
 
An over-reliance on the volatile global economy and failure to diversify the 
agrarian economies, coupled with a global economic recession in the 1980s, stringent 
trade laws and a move toward market fundamentalism, paved the way to the crisis in 
which most African countries find themselves. Despite astounding growth in the first 
two decades of independence, most countries in Africa, including Mozambique, run 
stagnant economies and have degenerated into economic malaise. For example, 
Meredith notes that, in Ghana, “[g]overnment payments to cocoa farmers as a 




Crippled by huge budget deficits, corruption and funds mismanagement, 
African countries failed to provide the desired public goods and services to satisfy 
their citizens. As Ake further suggests: “Colonial rule left most of Africa a legacy of 
intense and lawless political competition amidst an ideological void and a rising tide 
of disenchantment with the expectation of a better life” (1996: 5). There was a 
political vacuum that was created by Nationalist governments paving the way for a 
parasitic relationship between African states and Western-led institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Whereas post-colonial 
African elites had placed emphasis on the state as a vehicle for social transformation, 
IFIs became suspicious of the states‟ failure to usher in economic transformation. As 
Meredith himself notes:  
 
The remedy they devised for all Africa‟s ills was a series of radical economic 
reforms. Whereas in the 1960s Western development economists had advocated that 
the state should act as the motor of development and dismissed the role of markets, in 
the 1980s they regarded the state as a principal cause of development failure and 
called for market-oriented development strategies in place of government 
intervention (2004: 369-370). 
 
Neo-liberalism (Washington Consensus), as it was coined, culminated in the 
imposition of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) on most African economies 
by IFIs like the World Bank and IMF. As Mafeje notes:  
 
By the end of the 1980s Africa had hit rock bottom due to the pursuit of neo-colonial 
policies of its leaders, and the continent degenerated into a crisis of democracy, 
economic crisis, political crisis, agricultural crisis and crisis of governance in the 
1990s (2002: 6).  
 
Even the rise of self-confessed “socialist” states in Africa seemed to give 
credence to the reality of a crisis, as these states turned out to be as undemocratic and 
authoritarian as the rest, argues Mafeje (2002: 8). The results have, at best, been 
mixed and have raised outrage among the African intelligentsia, who are calling for 
continental renewal.      
 
Scholars criticising the status quo of global development have reached 
different conclusions. Mafeje noted that, in recognition of the parlous state of affairs, 
and in opposition to the Washington Consensus, African intellectuals are advocating 
the establishment of a “democratic developmental state” (2002: 11). He points out that 
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the process of entrenching a “democratic developmental state” should not be confused 
with the rejection of foreign aid per se, but all forms of external impositions. 
However, Mafeje laments that this position cannot be sustained without a full 
commitment to the principle of self-reliance (2002: 11). Ake clearly articulated the 
notion of self-reliance and noted the following:  
 
Self reliance is about responsibility. The embracing of self-reliance will be the real 
revolution of development in Africa. It is true that Africa‟s colonial history and its 
place in the world system have not been conducive to independence. … African 
leaders have preferred a cozy accommodation with dependence than the rigours of 
self-reliance, and they have usually accentuated dependence by their policies and 
behaviour instead of reducing it (1996: 140).   
 
In similar vein, Samir Amin argued that, while pretending to be apolitical, the 
World Bank has always shown a preference for the regimes most aligned with 
Washington and its allies—Mobuto, Marcos, Pinochet, Suharto and the Tontons 
Macoutes—without being greatly bothered by the question of democracy or by issues 
such as the corruption and ineffectiveness of many of its interventions under these 
regimes (1997: 25). On the wider spectrum, Ake suggests that “Africa requires 
somewhat more than the crude variety of liberal democracy that is being foisted on it, 
and even more than the impoverished liberal democracy that prevails in the 
industrialized countries” (1996: 138). He thus sees intense democratisation coupled 
with political decentralisation as the only viable alternative that will transform 
agrarian African states into economic powerhouses. These scholars then confirm what 
Stiglitz articulated in his thesis Globalization and it Discontents suggesting that: 
 
[t]he discontent with globalization arises not just from economics seeming to be 
pushed over everything else, but because a particular view of economics—market 
fundamentalism—is pushed over all other views. Opposition to globalization in many 
parts of the world is not to globalization per se—to the new sources of funds for 
growth or to the new export markets—but to the particular set of doctrines, the 
Washington Consensus policies that the financial institutions have imposed. And it is 
not just opposition to the policies themselves, but to the notion that there is a single 
set of policies that are right (2002: 220-221).  
  
Although the scholars cited above share similar views on the failure of global 
governance institutions, there are stark differences that exist among them. For Mafeje, 
Africa‟s quest for renewal is delineated in Africa‟s historical legacies of colonialism, 
neo-colonialism, and the failure of both totalitarian and civilian political elites to 
champion equity, prudent economics, and social justice. 
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He notes that  
 
[t]he inability of African leaders to cut the umbilical cord from their colonial masters 
is evidence of their lack of a viable alternative, and expounds that the ruling elites in 
the post-independence era have maintained the status quo and found opportunities for 
self-aggrandisement within it (Mafeje, 2002: 5).  
 
Stiglitz, on the other hand, sees the need for the reformation of the 
fundamentals of global institutions managing globalization like IMF and World Bank. 
He has suggested that political and economic reforms need to be reformed in 
themselves. Stiglitz thus posits the adoption of a post-Washington Consensus 
development model, where solutions need to be bound by global values of justice and 
equity whilst being true to situational factors and local contexts. Amin, on the 
contrary, invokes radical transformation of the entire international capitalist system, 
forging a new mode of production. He argues that a different globalisation will 
involve “challenging the options of neoliberal imperialism and the way in which 
collective triad imperialism runs the affairs of the planet within the framework of an 
extreme, or more „balanced‟, Atlanticism” (Amin, 2006: 147). This does not mean 
that Amin suggests autarky, for he sees globalisation not as a fact to be erased, but a 
positive fact: progress in history. He advocates a movement and a recognition that 
countries in the South need to increase their bargaining power to challenge and 
change the status quo of global political and economic relations. Countries in the 
South should work toward a world beyond the hegemonic dominance of the US, 
Japan and a stronger Europe, and create a multipolar world. 
 
Furthermore, Amin is cognisant that neo-liberal discourse cannot respond to 
the crisis of global development. He therefore, challenges the intellectual hubris that 
there are no alternatives within the capitalist system. Amin suggests that the 
development paradigm in its present form is incapable of having such dialogue. Amin 
further argues that a long term perspective is one of a long transition to world 
socialism, for only then can the goal of a genuinely multipolar world be attained 
(2006: 147). For Africa. however, this would translate into de-linking. For Amin, de-
linking changes the logic of internal capitalist accumulation as the world system is 
forced to adapt, not only by imposing a vision of adjustment within stagnation, but 
also one of replacing the concept of unilateral adjustment (of the weakest to the 
strongest) by the concept of mutual adjustment (1997: 40). In this instance, African 
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countries would have the bargaining power to formulate policies that best suit the 
socio-economic and political trajectories of their economies. However, Amin points 
out that the vision for international socialism will be different from the one that was 
practised by post-colonial Nationalist elites. He suggests the following: 
 
An alternative to capitalist globalization implies the recomposition of socialist 
perspectives in all different parts of the world. Socialism is not dead, but it will not 
be reborn through attempts to resuscitate old national social-democratic or statist 
Marxist-Leninist formulas or their tropical versions, all of which have not 
superseded. The new socialism should be much more internationalist, and at the same 
time contribute actively to the recomposition of regional groupings capable of 
opposing internationalism of peoples to that of capital (Amin, 1997: 76).    
 
These conceptual frameworks help explain the trajectory of Mozambique‟s 
political economy since the demise of the Portuguese regime. Expansion of mercantile 
colonial capital resulted in the incorporation of Mozambique into the global capitalist 
world, as Ake (1996) has noted. At independence, Nationalist leaders had a clear 
vision to break from the shackles of oppression and tyranny. Firstly, FRELIMO 
clearly identified itself as Marxist-Leninist and articulated a vision of social 
engineering to bring about radical reforms in agrarian-based Mozambique. Secondly, 
its domestic policies were driven by an alignment to the Bandug project and the Non-
aligned movement, emphasising socialism as an alternative development model to 
capitalism, which eventually led to collapse, albeit massive social transformation.  
 
The Nationalist vision was a failure. A call for country renewal rejuvenated 
ethnic tensions that were not resolved at independence. This meant that Mozambique, 
like other African states, degenerated into war, followed by an economic malaise. 
Western-backed institutions, the World Bank and IMF, as well as the UN, developed 
what were deemed effective strategies to set Mozambique on a trajectory of 
democratic reforms, peace and development, demonstrating a commitment to the 
„virtues of capitalism‟ to rid Mozambique‟s social ills. All the stages of 
Mozambique‟s political economy reflect the dilemmas that have been raised by 
scholars cited in this section. A move toward market fundamentalism highlights what 
Stiglitz has articulated. Over-reliance on aid reflects the dilemmas that Ake (1996) 
and Mafeje (2002) have raised: that African countries need to be self-reliant. And 
finally, post-conflict dilemmas confirm what Samir Amin has raised: Can African 
countries formulate a development discourse that reflects the post-colonial dilemmas 
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and impasse, without the impeding forces of the global North? These concepts then 
provide critical lenses through which to look at Mozambique as a case study, and to 
examine the trajectory of its political economy.    
 
1.5. Methodology  
 
This study relied on secondary data collected by leading international 
organisations such as the World Bank, OECD, WHO, Transparency International and 
FAO. The research looked at four variables: (a) hunger and malnutrition, (b) human 
development (specifically looking at the human development indicators and health 
indicators), (c) macroeconomic indicators (Aid/Official Development Assistance), and 
(d) governance, specifically focusing on corruption. A comprehensive government 
document on poverty reduction in Mozambique between 20062009, PARPA II, was 
also used to support claims that the data founded. The government of Mozambique‟s 
Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty for 20062009 (PARPA II) was 
developed and implemented to reduce the incidence of poverty from 54 percent in 
2003 to 45 percent in 2009. PARPA II is a successor to PARPA I (Government of 
Mozambique, 2001). It shares the same priorities in the areas of human capital 
development through education and health, improved governance, development of 
basic infrastructures and agriculture, rural development, and better macroeconomic 
and financial management. 
 
1.5.1. Discussion of Methodology: Limitations of Study   
 
Theories that provide important insights into the complexities of the political 
economy of development abound. This study embarks on an evaluative initiative to 
assess the consequences of political and economic reforms on the process of 
development in post-conflict Mozambique. This study took into account the fact that 
there is a huge gap between perceptions and reality in this field, which pointed clearly 
to the need for a quantitative methodology. As Leedy and Ormrod have argued,  
 
when little information exists on a topic, when variables are unknown, when a 
relevant theory base is inadequate or missing—a qualitative study can help define 
what is important—that is what needs to be studied ( 2001: 150).  
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The study looked at data on Mozambique collected by leading international 
organisations. The data were able to provide trends leading to inferences of the path 
that Mozambique has taken in the post-conflict phase. Quantitative research provides 
the framework for the social researcher to undertake a research project based on the 
positivist traditions, by observing and going beyond the observations. Where there is a 
huge gap between perception and reality, which is particularly the case with the empty 
rhetoric of poverty reduction and the consequences of the political economy of 
development, a quantitative study is useful. As Mark Franklin has suggested: “…for 
elaboration to progress very far we need to employ quantitative analysis” (Franklin, 
2008: 240). The political economy of development, to a great extent, involves poverty 
reduction and therefore requires elaboration. The aim of the study was thus to select 
from human development, macroeconomic and governance indicators and to observe 
them in order to determine the trends in the trajectory of Mozambique‟s political 
economy of development that they would reveal. To this end a quantitative study 
proved to be effective. 
 
Undoubtedly, the objective of any good social research is to use a 
methodology that will provide concrete evidence on the issues being considered. In 
the social sciences, poverty, in its multi-faceted dimension, is complex and a difficult 
concept to study in relation to the political economy of development. Initially, the 
researcher considered designing a qualitative research methodology, which relies on 
narratives as people understand the social reality to be. The researcher realised that 
through the use of a quantitative methodology the social variables chosen would 
reveal trends that can be quantified to bring forth substantial inferences in this study.  
 
While it would have been useful to conduct in-depth interviews and focus 
groups with local people on perceptions of government‟s chosen path of economic 
development, time and finances did not allow. The biggest limitation of the study was 
the absence of voices from Mozambicans themselves. Although the study was aided 
by an availability of data from leading international organisations, hearing the voices 
of people‟s „lived experiences on poverty‟ would have benefited the research. It 
would have been useful to analyse people‟s perceptions, hopes and aspirations of what 
Mozambique‟s post-conflict political economy should look like. The study therefore 
lacks the insights that international policy makers, government and people could have 
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provided when analysing the trajectory of Mozambique‟s post-conflict political 
economy. In this light, economic growth and poverty reduction remain a subject 
which does not reflect lived experiences of people. It would have been useful to 
analyse quantitative data and, subsequent to that, conduct qualitative in-depth 
interviews. Although the quantitative data in this study place questions on 
Mozambique as a successful post-conflict story, qualitative data would have 
strengthened the argument by bringing in perspectives of lived experiences in 
Mozambique.   
 
1.6. Organisation of the Study 
 
Chapter Two 
Is about crucial developments that took place in Mozambique in the post-
colonial era. This chapter takes into account the legacy that was bequeathed by 
colonialism, the civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO, and the new 
government‟s insistence on the „New Man‟ under the haze of scientific socialism. It 
reflects on the political economy of development under the Machel -led government 
and the demise of social engineering, and also highlights the inception of neo-
liberalism in Mozambique, particularly just before and after the death of Samora 
Machel in 1986. 
 
Chapter Three  
Gives an historical review of post-conflict Mozambique. The challenges and 
opportunities of post-conflict reconstruction in Mozambique are highlighted. The 
chapter challenges the assumptions that Mozambique is a successful post-conflict 
economy. Critical scholarship is used to highlight political and economic reforms and 
to see if these variables have repercussions on the development process in the post-
conflict state and set Mozambique on a trajectory of transformational development. 
The role of International Organisation and Official Development Assistance is also 




Analyses quantitative data on Mozambique‟s post-conflict political economy. 
This chapter provides empirical evidence on poverty and hunger, human 
development, macroeconomic and governance indicators to place questions on claims 
that Mozambique is a successful post-conflict story. 
 
Chapter Five  
Provides a summary of the study. This chapter critically reflects on the 













MOZAMBIQUE‟S POLITICAL-ECONOMY: FROM 
COLONIALISM TO POST-COLONIALISM 
 
2.1. Introduction  
 
This chapter provides an overview of Mozambique‟s history since its 
incorporation into the global capitalist system starting with the advent of colonialism 
through to the advent of independence in 1975, and up to the end of the civil war in 
1992. The history can be periodised as follows: a legacy of colonialism (1500-1975), 
the economic and social consequences of the policies of FRELIMO in the immediate 
post-colonial period (1975-1986); and the internal and external causes of 
destabilisation and finally, civil war (1977-1992). The purpose of the chapter is to 
highlight the relevance of history to understand and interpret trends that shape 
Mozambique‟s present day political, economic and social trajectories. It is shown here 
that the Nationalist political economy under the auspices of the „New Man‟ achieved 
ambivalent results. FRELIMO alienated the rural peasantry and became repressive, 
leading to the creation of a vacuum in which RENAMO capitalised to wage the war of 
destabilisation. Furthermore, the fact that internal disruptions by the guerrilla 
movement, RENAMO, were detrimental to achieving the goals of the democratic 
socialist revolution is highlighted. 
 
2.1.1. Mozambique‟s Colonial History: 1500s to 1975 
 
Historically, throughout the voyages of discovery, Mozambique played a 
strategic role in Portugal‟s imperialist quest. However, entrenched Portuguese 
colonialism can be traced to 1503 when trading ports and forts became regular ports 
of call on the route to the East. From 1885 to 1926, a plantation economy and labour 
reserves were created, which cemented Mozambique‟s incorporation into the global 
capitalist economy. Colonial economic domination in Mozambique was deepened 
between 1926 and 1960. 
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Protracted rule by the Portuguese in Mozambique under which locals were 
subject to the dictates of the colonial government curtailed political, economic and 
social freedoms. Europeans had advanced the idea and practice of forming colonies in 
distant lands as an economical way of meeting their needs and desires. They defended 
this practice through “paternalistic” attitudes and practices, and, invariably, the 
Portuguese empire was built on this ideology. Mozambique was thus incorporated 
into the global capitalist economy through imperialism and colonial mercantile 
capital, which led to the subjugation of locals and a stratification of society.  
 
Mozambique, like most African states, was crafted along the fault lines of 
colonial dominant classes, mercantile capital, imperialism, and the unequal exchange 
relationship that existed between a colonial petty bourgeoisie and underdeveloped 
African peasants (underclass). In addition, the borders constituting this modern 
African state were arbitrarily drawn when European states staked their claims on 
African territories with little consideration for the indigenous people therein (Tordoff, 
1997: 1-2, 29-30).  
 
Portugal‟s imperial quest sought to dominate and subjugate newfound 
territories. As Mittleman has argued: “Encouraged by Great Britain to entrench itself 
at the state level to ward off French and Belgian claims to hegemony, Portugal 
strengthened its position in Mozambique by the 1880s, substantiating its claims for 
colonies at the Berlin Conference in 18841885” (1981: 26). From the time of 
Portugal‟s ascendancy in the voyages of discovery, Mozambique remained a strategic 
player in that country‟s global dominance. Pitcher notes that “in school, children were 
given a map of Europe, the so-called „rose coloured‟ map, on which the Portuguese 
colonies were superimposed to convince children that Portugal was really a huge 
nation” (1993: 12). Portugal‟s imperial greatness and its colonising mission were 
constant themes of the official ideology and public monuments.  
 
For many Portuguese, it was difficult to imagine Portugal without its African 
possessions (Pitcher, 1993: 12). Imperialist domination led to the appropriation of 
property from the locals. As Mittleman has also argued: “[T]hrough a combination of 
conquest, military alliances, and payment in kind, the settlers alienated the lands of 
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the Africans” (1981: 24). Mittleman further points out that “under the terms of a 
policy adopted in 1901, the state extended its scope to include the rights to all land 
that was not privately owned” (ibid: 27). This move was counter-cultural, as 
traditionally, land in Mozambique belonged to royal families, and selected chiefs 
acted as arbiters of the right to farm, hunt and gather on these tracts. As Portuguese 
colonialism was entrenched, it destroyed the social fabric of pre-colonial governance, 
as the power of chiefs was curtailed to promote the interests of empire. According to 
Abrahamsson and Nilsson: 
 
Through the institution of local regents (regulos) and „land guards‟ (cabos de terra), 
the Portuguese attempted to involve in their colonial project that type of nobility 
which had deep roots in Mozambican culture and history, and thereby to exploit 
Mozambican society‟s traditional principles of legitimacy for the exercise of 
power…. Frequently the traditional rulers did not accept this subordination, and as a 
rule the Portuguese then appointed other families or clans to these functions 
(1995:21).  
 
The dismantling of the social structure was in tandem with Mozambique‟s 
incorporation into the global capitalist economy. The demand for labour drove 
Portugal to create a slave economy that could supply bourgeoning global markets. 
Mittleman notes that 
 
between 1800 and 1850, Prazeros (non-European mixed race people) exported 
Africans from their estates, and slave trade became the chief means of accumulation. 
Approximately 10,000 - 25,000 slaves were traded per year during this period, 
depending on the demand and the success of the hunt (1981: 28).  
 
Slaves were taken to the Dutch East India colony of the Cape and as far as 
Brazil, and as Abrahamsson and Nilson point out: “The French sugar planters on the 
islands of Reuniao and Bourbon in the Indian Ocean created a local demand for 
slaves” (1995: 22). However, Saul highlights a critical point, noting that “[t]he needs 
of a growing and industrialising European capitalism had developed far beyond 
luxury items and slaves” (1985: 38). Mozambique found herself under the whip of the 
global capitalist interests. Mozambique thus provided raw materials and foodstuffs, 
cheap labour, and profitable outlets for investments. And, as Saul has suggested, this 
task was fulfilled by a recognition that, rather than enter into a struggle over 
Mozambique, the more developed powers would leave the colony to Portugal, in the 
knowledge that an economically backward Portugal would have to let others exploit it 
for them  (1985: 35).   
22 
Thus colonial conquest took the form of extraction of raw materials that 
served the interest of British, French and South African colonial mercantile capital. 
Mittleman suggests that, in the 1890s, Lisbon gave concessions to large merchant 
concerns ─the Companhia de Mocambique, the Companhia de Zambezia, and the 
Compahnia de Niassa─ which were largely financed by Great Britain, France and 
Germany. Wuyts further points out that “Portuguese capital remained too weak to 
effectively organise the development of productive forces within the colony for its 
own accumulation requirements” (1979: 1) and that the colonial economy was 
strategically stratified: “The South became transformed into a labour reserve of South 
African mining complex
2
. The Centre and North came under the control of 
companies, which, in the centre, led to the development of a plantation economy” 
(ibid.).  
 
The persistence of a forced labour thesis is clearly articulated in Eduardo 
Mondlane‟s The Struggle for Mozambique (1969) as he notes that there was a 
“smooth transition from slavery to forced labour”. As Wuyts further argues: “A 
decree issued in 1899 stated that all natives of Portuguese overseas provinces are 
subject to the obligation, moral and legal, of attempting to obtain through work, the 
means that they lack to subsist and to better their social condition” (1979: 1-2). 
Plantations were developed where the locals were forced to work on sugar, sisal, 
copra, and cotton production. According to Mittleman: “[By] reaping surplus 
exorbitant taxes and forced labour, these firms acted as vehicles of merchant capital in 
the penetration of precapitalist formations” (1985: 27). Within their respective 
territories these concessions had administrative and political personalities in 
themselves and maintained a monopoly on tax collection, commerce and land. Thus, 
as both Wuyts and Mittleman note, labour power became a commodity under 
conditions of forced sale, culminating in the creation and maintaining of a quasi-
slavery system, shibalo, or forced labour, for Mozambicans, which provided wages 




                                                 
2
 With the discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1886, the South African mines increasingly drew on 
Mozambique as a source of cheap labour. They sequestered a large number of male workers from the 
southern provinces and encouraged reliance there on female and child labour. (Mittleman, 1981), p.27  
3
 Both Wuyts and Mittleman arrive at this conclusion. (Wuyts, 1979; Mittleman, 1985) 
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Mittleman has elaborated thus: 
 
Since traditionally private land tenure was unknown among Africans in Mozambique, 
the imperial authority came to possess virtually all plots worked by indigenous 
peoples. The state assigned land to “native” farmers and, to provide cheap materials 
for the textile mills in Portugal, forced them to plant cotton… The system of forced 
labour set back the development of farming among Africans, and productivity 
declined. (1985: 38)   
 
Colonial expansion took new forms as opposition was faced in different 
phases. The Fascist solution that was proposed at the beginning of the 20
th
 century in 
Portugal sought to restore the colonies to their rightful place. Hence, as Pitcher has 
argued: “Colonial rhetoric after 1926 emphasised Portugal‟s imperial greatness, which 
stressed the indivisibility of the Portuguese metropole and its colonies” (1993: 12). 
Clarence-Smith suggests that 
 
[f]ollowing a coup in Portugal in 1926, the new government of Antonio de Olivera 
Salazar embarked on a policy of reversing foreign penetration into Portugal‟s 
colonial possessions. His ‘Estado Novo’ promulgated a series of laws, culminating in 
the Colonial Statute of 1930. The ‘Estado Novo’ was designed to put Portugal in a 
pre-eminent position with its colonies. (1985: 663-7)  
 
Wuyts sums up the way in which Salazar synthesized the role of the colonies 
as follows 
The overseas territories were a logical solution to Portugal‟s problem of 
overpopulation, to settle Portuguese nationals in the colonies and for the colonies to 
produce raw materials for the motherland in exchange for manufactured goods (1979: 
2).  
 
Pitcher argues that “Mozambique was a law unto itself, run by foreign-owned 
concessionary companies with their own economic and political agendas” (1993: 12). 
Furthermore, the Fascist government sought to pacify colonial interests by tying them 
more closely to the Portuguese economy. However, the Salazar regime never 
challenged the dominant influence of South African capital over the southern part of 
the colony. The income that was earned from South Africa‟s mining concession 
companies through forced labour provided stability and created a favourable 
environment for Portugal to maintain its budget and external payment position. As 
Wuyts has further argued: “[H]ence Salazar‟s apparent paradoxical position of South 
African connection and his aloofness to the local settler interests” (1979: 2). 
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Furthermore, Salazar recognised that colonies had to be self-financing whilst 
at the same time being tied to the interests of Portugal. As Pitcher argues:  
 
In making the colonies pay for themselves, metropolitan imports of colonial products 
such as sugar, coffee, cotton, and cacao were maintained or increased after 1933, 
often as a result of legislation forbidding foreign imports of these products (1993: 
36).  
 
Through this move, Salazar realised the need to build the Portuguese economy 
without injecting funds into the colonies, resulting in a stronger concentration of funds 
to build resources within Portugal. Oliver and Atmore further suggest that “[t]he 
economic development of the colonies greatly benefited Portugal itself and, by the 
early 1960s, about 25 percent of the national budget was derived from Africa” (2005: 
268). 
 
 Oliver and Atmore suggest that, three decades after the Second World War, 
“the Portuguese empire in Africa proved an exception to the rule that a colonial 
system based in Europe could not resist the onslaught of African nationalism” (2005: 
267). They note two reasons for this exception. Firstly,  
 
Portugal was one of the poorest countries of Europe. It had a few industries and a 
standard of living not much higher than many African countries. Unlike those of 
other colonial powers, its colonial interests were considered not to be marginal but 
central to its economic existence (ibid, 268).  
 
Secondly, Portuguese imperialism was premised on romantic gloriana: 
“[F]rom 1932-1968 the Salazar government consistently played upon the feelings of 
national pride and glorified the achievements of the Portuguese imperial past as an 
inducement to future greatness” (ibid.). However, this inducement to future greatness 
was premised on illusionary visions. Oliver and Atmore suggest that “[i]n 1951, the 
colonies were theoretically incorporated into Portugal as „overseas provinces‟, but the 
inferior status of the African indegenas continued” (ibid.), and this became the 
bedrock of colonial resistance by FRELIMO. It also became an important factor in 
shaping the conflict that besieged the newly-created Mozambican post-colonial state. 
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2.1.2. FRELIMO and „The New Man‟  
 
The FRELIMO government championed the safeguarding of a democratic 
socialist revolution by giving power to the masses through the policies of the „New 
Man‟. In 1977, FRELIMO clearly articulated its vision as a Marxist-Leninist party, 
with an emphasis that the new society was premised on nation building, the creation 
of national unity and the elimination of ethnic differences. Perhaps the „New Man‟ 
can be clearly understood in what Hall and Young highlight: 
 
…the FRELIMO elite and social strata to which it appealed were profoundly 
convinced of the superiority of modern civilisation and the need to „catch up‟ with it. 
… The only way to resolve these dilemmas was to see the people as empty (emphasis 
added), but possessing the values to develop. The old world is backward and 
unscientific; the colonial world is corrupt and oppressive. Further, there is a sinister 
link between the two because the corrupt colonial world took and indeed reinforced 
the worst traditions of the old ways and lost the best. „Feudalism‟ and „capitalism‟ 
neatly encapsulated the twin enemies (1997:65).   
 
Samora Machel was firmly convinced that by undoing and dealing with the 
legacies of colonial capital and structures, nationhood and patriotism would be forged. 
This would further lead to a path placing Mozambique on a trajectory of socialist 
progress. The newly-elected president held that  
 
[t]he new power is not something abstract. The new power is ourselves who with all 
our shortcomings must wield it. The „New Man‟ should be able to wield the power 
and this initiative will not step down from a cloud. Our responsibility is greater 
although our capacity is still limited. But we have one great and decisive advantage: 
we have a correct political line, and the masses are with us (Machel, 1985).  
 
For Machel, to create “The New Man” a tangible democratic system would be 
followed, and it was not based on abstract wishful thinking or empty idealism. Machel 
noted that 
 
[t]he popular character of the power that is being built implies a genuine and 
profound democracy such as has never been known in our country‟s history. And like 
power, democracy is not something abstract: if it is used to be tangible, we must 
create conditions for it to come into effect (1985).  
 
 FRELIMO under the Machel leadership adopted Marxism-Leninist principles 
to mobilise the „New Man‟. As a vanguard party of the revolution, leaders stressed the 
importance of a radical transformation of colonial and traditional structures which 
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ensured the dominance of colonial capitalism and feudalism. FRELIMO remained 
suspicious of the role of traditional authorities and African socialism. As Cau notes: 
“Colonial territorial divisions that used to be ruled by the traditional authorities were 
replaced by the new territorial divisions with new rulers” (2004: 44). To promote 
democratic decentralisation, the ruling party abolished the chieftaincy by electing 
officials called the Grupos Dinamizadores (Dynamising Groups) which had aligned 
themselves with party interests. FRELIMO believed that traditional authorities 
supported the interests of the colonisers, the promotion of democratic governance, 
however, required the election of officials who were not elected through lineage and 
were free of any ethnic affiliations. As Cau also suggests: “The roles that traditional 
authorities had been performing under colonialism in relation to land administration 
were also given to the newly formed structures” (2004: 47). The alienation of 
traditional authorities and the peasantry have been suggested by some theorists as a 
causal factor of the war of destabilisation by RENAMO. This will be explained 
below.  
 
This democratic socialist revolution faced an internal backlash and proved to 
be counter-productive. In the same year that adherence to Marxist-Leninism was 
pronounced, Cabrita suggests,  
 
[e]xecutive, legislative and judiciary powers were vested in FRELIMO. As party 
leader, Samora Machel was also head of the state and government, the speaker of 
Parliament, and the chief justice, in addition to being the commander of the Armed 
Forces (2000: 85).  
 
Machel, himself, had highlighted that in the pursuit of organising a democratic 
“life, the exercise of power, its form and methods, must correspond to FRELIMO‟s 
principles” (1985). In doing so Machel hoped that democracy would be organised 
around the statutes found in Chapter VII of FRELIMO‟s charter: free discussion, the 
submission of the minority to the majority, collective responsibility, and criticism and 
self-criticism as regards work and behaviour (1985). For example, although the 
Machel-led government had placed emphasis on the development of the rural 
peasantry; the peasantry was not incorporated into the democratic life. Modernisation 
of agriculture was seen as a precondition for take-off. However, as Abrahamsson and 
Nilsson suggest: “Development planners had insufficient knowledge of the realities of 
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the rural areas” (1995: 30). It meant that the rural peasantry was depoliticised as 
governance structures were abolished to reflect the interests of the party. According to 
Abrahamsson and Nilsson, “the planning process was further divorced from 
Mozambican reality by the presence of Soviet and East European state officials and 
planners” (1995: 30).   
 
A pessimistic prophecy of Africa‟s governance failure was thus fulfilled, as 
the seeds of dictatorship were evident in the new political system. Machel indicated 
that  
[t]he new Mozambican regime, was prepared to go to great lengths to impose the will 
of those classes, even if it meant forcing those who refuse to accept such an 
imposition, and to repress those who oppose such a will (1985: 33).  
 
FRELIMO thus demanded that Mozambicans be turned into a caricature of 
what the elites wanted society to follow. Cabrito further notes that, “[u]nity of thought 
became a feature of Mozambique‟s new political vocabulary. The eradication of all 
forms of organised political opposition having been successfully accomplished, 
FRELIMO turned on its own supporters” (2000: 86). According to Newitt, 
 
Machel‟s style of self-exhortation, his appeals for self-sacrifice and hard work might 
succeed in war time and might be relevant in facing emergencies; however; the party 
was deliberately exclusive and its policies alienated large sections of the population 
(2002: 207) 
 
This move confirmed what most African historians, such as Cooper (2002) 
and other political commentators, have stated, that Mozambique merely moved from 
one form of totalitarianism to another —and in this case, specifically from Fascism to 
Leninism, for behind the mantra of modernisation, Machel was haunted by the 
residues of the colonial past and woven with garments that had authoritarian 
tendencies. As Newitt further clearly elaborates:  
 
Behind Machel‟s Marxist rhetoric was a politician very similar to the first generation 
of African nationalist leaders for whom the ideals of the anti-colonial struggle and of 
non-tribal, non-racial nationalism were a real motivating force, in marked contrast to 
the military dictators and corrupt politicians who were soon to succeed them and who 
were protected by the superpowers during the Cold War (2002: 207). 
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2.1.3. Mozambique‟s Post Colonial Political Economy―1975 to 1986  
 
When independence was achieved in Mozambique, the triumphant FRELIMO 
government embarked on a path of modernisation and the creation of a new society 
under the auspices of the „New Man‟. Mozambique inherited a tumultuous colonial 
past which had systematically curtailed political, economic, and social freedoms and 
remained one of the most underdeveloped countries in southern Africa. FRELIMO 
thus sought to undo the victimisation of the past through social engineering. 
FRELIMO‟s optimism under the Machel leadership championed a new direction 
which encompassed a political economy that was centrally planned.  
 
The realisation of this ideal was placed in the hands of FRELIMO as a 
vanguard party. A transformed political economy would be achieved by what both 
Hanlon (1990) and Saul (1985) saw as a “non-aligned foreign policy and a socialist 
domestic policy”. Machel‟s conviction irrevocably echoed the words of FRELIMO‟s 
first president Eduardo Mondlane: 
 
I am now convinced that FRELIMO has a clearer political line than ever before. The 
common basis which we all had when we formed FRELIMO was hatred toward 
colonialism and the belief in the necessity to destroy the colonial structure and 
establish a new social structure. But what type of social structure, what type of 
organisation we would have, no-one knew. No, some did know, some did have ideas, 
but even they had rather theoretical notions which were themselves transformed by 
the struggle. Now, however, there is a qualitative transformation in thinking which 
has emerged during the past six years which permits me to conclude that at present 
FRELIMO is much more socialist, revolutionary and progressive than ever and that 
the line, the tendency, is now more and more in the direction of socialism of the 
Marxist-Leninist variety. (Mondlane, 1969).   
 
 
In the first five years after independence, impressive progress was made. For 
example, Hanlon has pointed out that there was an improvement in the health sector: 
“A vaccination campaign in 1976-78 reached 95% of the population and provided a 
highly accurate forecast for the 1980 census” (1990: 9). This move led organisations 
like the WHO to label Mozambique as a success story. According to Hanlon,  
 
[a] WHO survey in 1982 showed that 81% of rural children had been seen at least 
once by a health worker, an incredible percentage for Africa, and two-thirds of rural 
health posts surveyed had a sufficient stock of essential drugs (1984: 9).  
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This was a direct result of an approach that sought to re-organise the economy 
to meet Mozambique‟s social goals. The Machel government embarked on a 
programme that clearly had an anti-capitalist sentiment. Pitcher contends that “much 
evidence supports the argument that the government was reactive rather than 
proactive, tactical rather than ideological in the first two years after independence” 
(2002: 38). Pitcher notes that “the rate of settler departure in the initial years of 
independence lends credence to claims that government measures were reactive rather 
than revolutionary” (ibid.). She further suggests that this move reveals some of the 
compromises that were made during the early years, which would later shape the 
trajectory of the command economy and the transition to a free market one (Pitcher, 
2002: 38).  
 
As soon as independence was achieved, laws were enacted to confiscate 
private banks and schools, hospitals, doctors‟ practices, and legal chambers. Cabrita 
further suggests that “[a]s a result of these measures, coupled with the sense of 
insecurity stemming from arbitrary police action since the transition to independence, 
the exodus of whites gained momentum” (2000: 109). Mozambique was thus deprived 
of crucial skills which formed the backbone of the economy. In response, the 
FRELIMO government, in early 1977, ordered the expulsion from Mozambique of 
white settlers who were entitled to dual citizenship and the confiscation of their 
property (Cabrita, 2000: 108). Whether this move proved led to the demise of the 
economy will be discussed below.  
 
The newly-independent state embarked on a process of nationalisation. 
Lacking a skilled workforce, the FRELIMO government took over what had been left 
by the colonial government and also built upon, and continued, a colonial legacy of 
state intervention. They maintained a controlling hand by inhibiting private 
competition and therefore assumed the ownership of all assets formerly belonging to 
the state. The government also controlled the rural economy by controlling production 
of the peasantry. As mentioned earlier, after independence, much attention was paid to 
collectivisation of farming following the Soviet style, bolstered by the importation of 
fully-mechanised agricultural machinery from the Eastern Bloc. However, as Tarp 
and Igel Lau have argued, “numerous communal villages were established, but the 
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inability of government to provide adequate support on a continuous basis for their 
development gradually undermined peasant confidence in FRELIMO” (1998: 290). 
 
However, in implementing these policies, FRELIMO had underestimated a 
backlash against the revolutionary rhetoric used in an attempt to rally support to build 
a successful democratic socialist state. As John Saul puts it: “In the forums provided, 
peasants had raised their voices loud and clear regarding the negative impact upon 
them of misguided development policies” (1985: 38). Wuyts further clarifies “that 
FRELIMO had in any case long underestimated the danger of class formation within 
the peasantry and the threat that could pose to a long term sustaining of the socialist 
impulse in Mozambique” (1986). This move led to the alienation of peasant farmers, 
with particular reference to the role they played in this agrarian economy. It marked 
the decline of the economy as party interest had logically failed to build confidence 
among the peasantry. As Tarp & Igel Lau suggest,  
 
[t]he government increased its support for private farmers in 1983 by improving the 
allocations of machinery and inputs, but producer prices for marketed crops were 
kept below market clearing prices which discouraged farmers from selling their 
output on official markets (1998: 291)  
 
 Despite signs that the economy was heading towards collapse, FRELIMO 
under the Machel leadership unveiled an ambitious ten year plan in 1981 (Plano 
Perspective Indicativo [PPI]). Machel further expected the 1980s to be the „Decade 
for the victory over Underdevelopment‟. Four key programmes formed the core of the 
plan: “(1) cooperativisation of the countryside, (2) creation and development of heavy 
industry, (3) development of a state agricultural sector, and (4) massive human 
resource development” (Tarp & Igel Lau, 1998: 290). It was expected that growth 
would average 17% and agricultural production would increase fivefold. 
Industrialisation would be entrenched with a strong emphasis placed on the 
production of iron and steel, aluminum, chemicals and fertilisers from gas, paper and 
heavy engineering goods (ibid).  
 
With the benefit of historical hindsight, it can be seen that FRELIMO 
underestimated structural legacies that had bedeviled Mozambique since its birth. At 
the Party‟s Fourth Congress in 1983 limitations of the plan were noted. This did not 
improve the trajectory of economic development. As Tarp & Igel Lau have noted: 
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“The centralised control and structure of the economy remained intact, and real GDP 
decreased at an average rate of 3.5 percent per year from 1981 to 1986” (1998: 292). 
The increasing threat of South Africa‟s destabilisation by arming RENAMO also 
exacerbated the decline of the economy. Economic decline was only in the initial 
stages for both the war of destabilisation and the pursuit of socialist central pushed the 
economy into decline. 
  
 In sum, socialist central planning adopted by FRELIMO at independence 
failed to achieve the goals that had been set. For example, Abrahamsson & Nilsson, in 
terms of agricultural performance, note that “of the planned 15, 000 cooperatives, by 
1983 only 350 had been set up, most of them with huge administrative problems” 
(1995: 49-50). Tarp & Igel Lau further argue that “the recession caused by the war 
and the grossly overvalued exchange rate had disastrous effects on exports, and the 
increasing difficulties in trading made the situation even worse” (1998: 293). 
Furthermore, Tarp and Igel Lau note that “by 1985 exports of goods and services were 
less than 30 percent of the 1980 level, and imports contracted as well” (ibid). It 
therefore merits re-emphasis that Mozambique‟s socialist political economy was a 
failure, however, this section will assess why that was the case, for there are different 
explanations proposed. Tarp & Igel Lau articulate the following situation towards the 
demise of the socialist project: 
 
Consequently Mozambique became heavily dependent on foreign grants and loans. 
At the end of 1986, Mozambique had a total outstanding international debt of US$3.4 
billion as compared to US$750 million in the early 1980s, and scheduled debt service 
reached 275 per cent in 1986. Moreover aid flows accounted for more than half of 
GDP, and capital expenditures-which remained stagnant in monetary terms during 
1981-88-were almost completely donor financed by 1986, leaving little room for the 
government to manoeuvre (1998: 293).  
 
 For commentators, difficult questions are raised in attempting to assess the 
failure of socialist central planning in post-colonial Mozambique. Did socialist central 
planning fail because socialism was not given a chance to develop as a result of 
internal factors, or was the international climate hostile to socialist progress? Hanlon 
has argued that “FRELIMO‟s most serious error was to assume that it would pursue a 
non-aligned foreign policy and a socialist economic policy” and suggests that this was 
naivety on their part. He further argues that the mistake that FRELIMO made was to 
assume that it had real freedom of choice (1990: 17). The choice was to be found in a 
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strong affirmation that, as a vanguard party of the socialist revolution, the party would 
not be subject to criticisms by the masses.  
 
These arguments do not go beyond the nuances of revolutionary rhetoric. 
Hanlon strongly believes that if the socialist democratic revolution was not fiercely 
competing with the capitalist bloc, development would have been fostered. Some 
commentators have questioned whether revolutionary rhetoric led to a mass exodus of 
Portuguese skills, leading to the economic failure. The argument put forward is that 
Mozambique lacked human capital that could amass skills and set the country on a 
trajectory of progress and change.  
 
These explanations are inadequate, for they attribute societal collapse to the 
inability of ingenuity and transformation. The argument in this study is that the „New 
Man‟ depoliticised Mozambican citizens. FRELIMO, as a party, laid a foundation 
from which a fragmented citizenship would emerge, and unequivocally used war and 
external global conditions as an excuse to curtail revolutionary progress. Although the 
post-colonial ruling elite had a clear idea on what was to be done, even with 
comparisons to other postcolonial African elites, perhaps a clearer explanation is to be 
found in what Newitt argues, and what most commentators agree on, and which is a 
central thesis of the argument in this section: 
 
The FRELIMO leadership attempted a radical reconstruction of Mozambique‟s 
society and economy at a time when, as a result of partly of natural disasters and 
partly of the chaos of the decolonisation process, the machinery of government and 
the economic infrastructure of the country were on the verge of collapse, and when 
southern Africa itself was about to sail into the eye of the geopolitical storm which 
marked the final phase of the Cold War (2002: 195)  
 
FRELIMO‟s agenda underestimated the pace of social change itself. 
The political project became inward-focused, though relying on Soviet 
support, and lacked the foresight, therefore, to plan effectively the path of 
socialist transformation. The civil war also brought destabilisation to the ruling 
party. Despite FRELIMO‟s insistence on nation-building between workers and 
peasants, the advances of RENAMO leading to a full scale civil war revealed 
cracks in the era of socialist experimentation.  
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According to Abrahamsson and Nilsson: 
 
The Mozambican state was never a nation-state with legitimacy but a state-nation 
project still engaging in nation building. It was held together only as long as the 
state‟s abilities to protect citizens from violence could be maintained and as long as it 
could guarantee the most basic supply requirements. This legitimacy was seriously 
undermined by the destabilizing war and the collapse of the economy (1995: 93) 
 




 emerged from a protracted liberation war (196474) that was 
fought to oust Portuguese imperialism, and was almost immediately plunged into a 
civil war in 1977. Although Samora Machel had envisioned a society deeply 
entrenched within the values of the „New Man‟ in which ethnicity was not politicised, 
it resurfaced to haunt the modernising bureaucrat. Manning notes that after 
independence “FRELIMO arrived in Maputo seasoned by a series of internal 
leadership struggles that produced both a firm ideological project and a number of 
dissatisfied elites, most of whom were from the center and north of the country” 
(2002: 38).  
 
The seeds of resistance had been sown and culminated in the formation of 
RENAMO, backed by powerful external allies, such as the Rhodesian security forces 
who were at the time engaged in their own liberation struggle in present-day 
Zimbabwe, and civil war ensued. With the perceived threat of a Nationalist black 
government, the external nature of the conflict escalated as, in the 1980s, RENAMO 
was picked up by a new patron, South African military intelligence, who sought to use 
the group to destabilise neighbouring Mozambique. Mozambique thus became a 
battleground of Cold War politics, as various initiatives were taken to end the war.  
 
FRELIMO failed to address systemic regional differences that were also 
salient features of Mozambican society before independence was achieved. This was 
evident in the case of FRELIMO‟s leadership, which bolstered Eduardo Mondlane, 
                                                 
4
  For a further analysis of the post-conflict peace building and democratisation, see the researcher‟s 
writing on „Mozambique‟s Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Analysis of the Political, Economic and 
Security Dimensions (1992-2007)‟, done in partial fulfillment of the requirement of a Honours Degree 
in International Relations at the University of Cape Town, South Africa.  
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Marcelino do Santos, and Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano, Mozambique‟s first 
two presidents after independence. All but dos Santos were born in Gaza province. As 
Manning suggests:  
 
Foremost among these [failures] were a sense of ethnic and regional domination (by 
southern groups against the center and center-north) and heavy-handed attempts by 
the new FRELIMO government to displace existing social and economic relations in 
the countryside without prompt and effective replacements (2002: 39).  
 
Against the background of perceived ethnic prejudice, a group of disenchanted 
leaders who were in opposition to the southern leadership used their expulsion from 
the hierarchy of FRELIMO as a vehicle to mobilise the civil war. They were: Uria 
Simango and Mateus Gwenjere from Sofala, and Lazaro Nkavandame, of Cabo 
Delgado. Furthermore as Hall and Young (1997) and others have pointed out, 
RENAMO proved quite adept at incorporating powerful cultural references into its 
military and political strategies. In this, it resembled armed groups in Liberia, as 
described compelling by Stephen Ellis (1999).  
 
 Although it is assumed that RENAMO remained a guerilla unit without a clear 
political plan, it relied on the abolition of the chieftaincy and the alienation of rural 
peasantry by FRELIMO to launch its attacks. This argument is contentious though, as 
this is not the causal factor of the war. Several scholars note that RENAMO exploited 
the weakness in FRELIMO‟s position of totally dismissing traditional authorities, 
even those who were willing to subject themselves to a democratic election process 
through re-establishing them (Wilson, 1992; Alexander, 1994; 1997). According to 
Cau (2004), various studies show that RENAMO was a foreign-created movement 
that acted against the population; not only the post-independence authorities, but 
mainly ordinary rural people ―burning their houses; mutilating and killing, robbing 
them of their belongings, kidnapping, etc. (Magaia, 1988; Minter, 1989; 1994). 
 
 There seem to be no grounds to attribute the main cause of the war to the 
political alienation of chiefs and the rural peasantry. What is clear though, as noted by 
Vines (1991), is that RENAMO was a successful rebel movement. At the peak of the 
war, it operated in all the ten provinces of Mozambique. It can be pointed out that 
RENAMO, through the use of terror, force and coercion manipulated the rural areas to 
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their advantage. In Manica for example, Alexander affirms that RENAMO sometimes 
invented chiefs in positions of authority (1997: 10). However, this was a symbiotic 
relationship which thrived on the false provision of political security through the use 
of terror. As Cau elaborates:  
 
Alexander (1994; 1997) claims that even in areas where RENAMO had a certain 
degree of support and where it re-established the traditional authorities (like some 
areas of Manica and Sofala provinces), people and the traditional authorities soon 
became dissatisfied with RENAMO‟s restrictions on movement, and extraction of 
food and labour, (2004: 58).  
 
The war, coupled with economic collapse internally, led to the demise of the 
socialist period, particularly in the 1980s. Arndt suggests that  
 
[i]t was clear that drastic economic reform measures were required, but even more 
pressing was the need for peace, as repeatedly stressed by Samora Machel, until his 
death in a plane crash in South Africa in 1986 (1999: 4).  
 
The first attacks by RENAMO were reported soon after independence, in 1977 
(Manning 2002). By July 1982, Africa Confidential was reporting that the provinces 
of Manica, Sofala and Inhambane “are considered unsafe outside the main towns” 
(Manning 2002). Manning also notes that “[i]n 1984, Mozambique and South Africa 
signed the Nkomati Accord, designed to halt hostilities between the two countries and 
end support for one another‟s armed opposition, however the war in Mozambique 
carried on” (2002: 38).  
 
Vines further notes that “day-to-day RENAMO operations had by late 1983 
become the responsibility of RENAMO itself; even South African military 
intelligence found its influence on RENAMO diminished” (1994). The hope of a 
peace agreement seems to have been far-fetched, as FRELIMO and RENAMO would 
fight for more than fifteen years before signing the GPA in Rome in 1992. The civil 
war debilitated Mozambique‟s social and economic infrastructure. This is pointed out 
by Manning:  
 
The conflict was characterized by the routine resort to violence against civilian 
populations, the systemic use of terror meant to bolster relatively weak military 
capabilities, the widespread use of child soldiers and forced labour, and the 
establishment of economies of pillage (2002: 38).  
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Hanlon also points out that during the war, health posts were closed or 
destroyed by RENAMO, and he further estimates that 60 percent of all primary 
schools were destroyed or closed. In addition, more than 3000 rural shops were 
destroyed or closed, and most never re-opened (1996).  
 
The FRELIMO government was in talks with RENAMO to end the civil war. 
This was further demonstrated in FRELIMO‟s renunciation of its place as the single 
legal political party in Mozambique and the writing of a new Constitution in 1990, 
enshrining principles of liberal, multiparty democracy. The signing of the GPA came 
after a sudden collapse of the Eastern socialist bloc. Furthermore, the post-Cold War 
phase instilled a conviction in the realms of international institutions that 
democratisation was a possible answer to solve economic crisis and civil war, a point 
that will be elaborated in the next chapter. Manning further suggests that at  
 
the eve of decolonization, democracy was introduced in response to a political and 
logistical problem; the transfer of power from colonial authorities to independent 
African states. Similarly, the democratic transitions of the 1990s have been 
demanded (by protestors and donors) and undertaken (by African governments) 
primarily for instrumental reasons (2002: 16).  
 
2.2.1. Foreign Relations Under the Machel Regime 
 
A myriad of reasons explain why Mozambique‟s political economy landscape 
was informed by the global political relations in the second half of the 20
th
 Century. 
The anti-colonial struggle had been mobilised with the goal of creating a „new 
society‟ and ridding Mozambique of the vestiges of colonialism. This entailed 
undoing everything that the Portuguese empire had brought into being. Crucially, the 
Cold War context provided a playing field for the newly-elected Mozambican 
government under FRELIMO to choose an alternative system to capitalism. However, 
this was a minefield through which it required delicate maneuvering to negotiate. 
FRELIMO under Machel sought to strengthen and create allies internationally and 
across southern Africa. Internationally, several members of the FRELIMO party 
worked tirelessly to incorporate Mozambique‟s political and economic ideology into 
the socialist world through COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), 
as well as maintaining cautious relations with the US and Britain.  
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Marcelino dos Santos, a senior figure in FRELIMO, pointed out that one had 
to understand that Mozambique‟s participation in an organisation like COMECON 
was a natural development in the socioeconomic process of the People‟s Republic of 
Mozambique; it was part of COMECON‟s natural growth
5
. Henrisken noted that the 
People‟s Republic of Mozambique had embarked on a course similar to Maoist 
China‟s self-help and self-dependence (emphasis added) (1978: 228), as expounded in 
Mao‟s The little red book:  
 
On what should our policy rest? It should rest on our own strength, and that means 
regenerations through ones efforts. We stand for self-reliance. We hope for foreign 
aid but cannot be dependent on it; we depend on our own efforts, on the creative 
power of the whole army and the entire people (Mao Zedong, 1964).  
 
Furthermore, Mao propounded that this struggle was not only for China, it 
extended to all the world and peoples that were opposed to imperialism (1964). This 
opened the way for countries in the Eastern block to remain important donors and 
players in financing the development project in Mozambique. The globalisation of 
politics in Mozambique is not a novel phenomenon, as it stems from international 
involvement since the inception of Portuguese rule. This was perpetuated in the new 
republic through the alignment of the „New Man‟ with Mao‟s ideals of self-reliance, 
whilst at the same time expressing dependence on the socialist bloc, specifically with 
Russia.  
 
However, the aspirations towards inclusion in the socialist world and the 
benefits of this were dashed. As Newitt points out: “Mozambique‟s application to join 
COMECON was turned down in 1981, and the country found itself without strong 
flows of aid or international credit” (2002: 206). Russia vetoed Mozambique‟s 
application to join COMECON but maintained that it would neither increase aid nor 
decrease it. This move served to highlight the polarised nature that was evident in 
Mozambique‟s foreign policy. Firstly, as Hanlon has suggested: “To the Soviet 
Union, Mozambique was merely a „Marxist oriented‟ country which would provide 
no military bases and was too far away to be of much interest” (1990: 28). In 
retrospect, argues Hanlon, Mozambique received all the flak but none of the benefits 
that were enjoyed by states in the middle of the East-West conflict. Secondly, as 
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Hanlon has suggested: “To the US Mozambique was a „Marxist Soviet satellite‟, and 
hence South Africa‟s destabilisation was acceptable” (ibid.).  
 
Cabrita suggests that, ideologically,  
 
FRELIMO made its realignment with the Eastern bloc countries more obvious. 
FRELIMO regarded them as its natural allies. From the 1970s onwards, FRELIMO 
strengthened ties with the Moscow-aligned Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and 
its armed wing, the Accao Revolucionaria Armada (ARA) (2000: 66).  
 
China and Tanzania served as models of inspiration with regard to achieving 
the democratic socialist revolution and foreign policy. However, historically there had 
been strained relationships with other socialist countries. After the 1965 Che Guevara 
fiasco
6
, the Cubans forged strong relations with FRELIMO. Marcelino do Santos was 
reported to have said that “[u]ntil then, Mondlane had ensured a balanced East-West 




However, the relations were further complicated. As Abegunrin has argued:  
 
The rivalry between the two Communist giants was extended to southern Africa 
where the USSR and the People‟s Republic of China were competing to influence the 
liberation Movements and the Frontline states (2007: 316).  
 
Initially, FRELIMO was able to balance military assistance from both China 
and USSR, while at the same time remaining neutral. Eventually, as Cabrita suggests, 
“the Machel-Santos leadership sided with the Soviet Union and those under its sphere 
of influence, turning its back on the Chinese” (2000: 67). As Abegunrim further 
suggests:  
Mozambique broke relations with China not over ideological issues but simply in 
order to obtain sophisticated military hardware from the Soviet Union; as this 
weaponry would safeguard Mozambique‟s sovereignty against the threat posed by 
the hostile regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia (2007: 319).  
                                                 
6
 Cuba supported guerrilla organisations in various Latin American countries. In Africa, which Guevara 
saw as „imperialism‟s weak link, Cuba planned to mount a military campaign against Southern Africa‟s 
white regimes. However, relations proved to be tumultuous with the FRELIMO leader. Mondlane had 
refused military assistance and remarked that Guevara had behaved „like a doctor, extremely conceited, 
without paying attention to his interlocutors‟. The Cubans lambasted Mondlane for his unsavoury 
remarks, referring to him as a FRELIMO president „who travels to the United States more frequently 
than a State Department ambassador‟. Cabrita, p.45  
7
 Marcelino dos Santos, in an interview with Radio Mocambique, 100 GMT 21 and 22 June 1988 
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 Socialist experimentation was on the demise in Mozambique as Soviet support 
was on the decline. The ushering of a democratic tide at the end of the 1980s and 
beginning of the 1990s across the world, the collapse of the Berlin Wall on 9 
November 1989; the balance of world power shifted, as Communism imploded and 
Soviet military power began to wane. This was partly due to the vision that Soviet 
leader Mikhail Gorbachev represented by his introduction of the concepts of 
perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness), which were intended to bring 
about a measure of democratic accountability to the system.  
 
Regionally, the democratic socialist revolution faced the impeding effects of 
two white colonial and totalitarian regimes, in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South 
Africa, which were fiercely opposed to Black Nationalist rule in Mozambique. The 
Machel government was committed to the advancing of a stand on international 
affairs by which it not only declared itself as a Marxist-Leninist state, but as also 
having a non-aligned policy. From a strategic angle, the Machel government believed 
that Non Aligned states such as Sweden and the Netherlands would continue to 
provide sufficient aid to enable the country to evade the clutches of the US-dominated 
World Bank and IMF, which were beginning to flex their muscles in Africa. This 
move proved to be counter-intuitive as the Cold War bolstered support to arm 
neighbouring South Africa and Rhodesia to contain Mozambique, a pariah state. 
Newitt further suggests that  
 
[t]he non-aligned stance served to alienate its immediate neighbours, Rhodesia and 
South Africa, as well as the US and its allies which began to look on Mozambique as 
another domino that had fallen to communism
8
 (2002: 206).  
 
In the end, faced with a collapsing economy coupled with the fact that 
international policy-making in the West had shifted towards an intense alienation of 
socialist states, Mozambique had limited choices. Within this context, Mozambique 
had to garner support from the Socialist bloc, and already events in most of these 
countries pointed toward revolutionary change. To the north, Tanzania remained an 
important and strategic ally. Kaunda in Zambia remained unequivocally committed to 
ridding southern Africa of colonial regimes. However, relations with Kamuzu Banda 
                                                 
8
 Particularly after FRELIMO expelled a number of US diplomats in 1981, alleging that they were 
spies.  
40 
of Malawi remained strained, as his regime was supported by the Western capitalist 
bloc. Winds of democratic change swept over most of southern African states; a move 
toward democratisation seemed inevitable, leading to the collapse of self-proclaimed 
socialist regimes in Zambia under Kaunda and Nyerere in Tanzania, and the 
authoritarian government of Kamuzu Banda in neighbouring Malawi.  
 
Contestations are rife as to whether Mozambique came to independence in a 
relatively benign or malevolent period of global political-economic relations. The US 
had suffered defeat in the Vietnam War, and Ronald Reagan‟s election as US 
president in November 1980 derailed discussions of increased peaceful cooperation 
and dialogue. Hanlon argues that  
 
Reagan intensified the Cold War through a series of proxy wars in Angola, Nicaragua 
and Mozambique, where the US backed and helped to create, openly or covertly, 
armed opposition forces (2008: 9).  
 
Newitt also contends that the Reagan and Thatcher administrations were 
unsympathetic to Mozambique‟s plight and saw in the Mozambican situation a way of 
using local conflict to further Reagan‟s favourite concept of „constructive 
engagement‟, in other words, bringing about controlled change in the region along 
lines favourable to Western interests (2002: 213).  
 
The apartheid regime was deemed by the US and other Western bloc countries 
as a strategic ally in containing communism in the neighbouring southern African 
states. Mozambique, however, pressed for a peace treaty with South Africa, years 
before Machel was killed in a mysterious plane crash in 1986. The Nkomati Accord 
was signed in 1984, with FRELIMO believing that this would pave a way for 
progressive peace and curb South Africa‟s continued support to RENAMO. The 
reasons for the signing of the treaty on the part of apartheid South Africa are obscure. 
However, some analysts have highlighted that South Africa wanted to maintain geo-
strategic influence to generate power from the Cabora Bassa Dam and that the 
overthrow of the FRELIMO government had never been South Africa‟s objective. As 
Newitt further argues: “This premature attempt at peace rapidly broke down, however, 
as RENAMO insisted that elections for a new government should be part of any new 
deal” (2002: 214).  
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2.3 Conclusion  
 
Nearly eleven years of socialist experimentation through the policies of the 
„New Man‟ produced results that conflict with the ideals that FRELIMO espoused 
when Machel came to power. This chapter has provided the chronology of historical 
events that help to explain Mozambique‟s present day dilemma. The chapter has 
argued that the choices that were made during the phase of socialist experimentation 
need to be evaluated against the socio-political history of Mozambique. As a former 
colony of Portugal, Mozambique inherited structural inequalities as a result of an 
oppressive colonial system that repressed political, civil and economic liberties. This 
was a system that also stratified slave labour and created clear distinctions between 
citizens and subjects.  
 
This system bequeathed structural legacies (political and economic institutions) 
that the Nationalist government under Machel had to deal with. Ideas for a democratic 
socialist revolution were rooted and grounded in legitimate concerns. The FRELIMO 
government sought to undo the victimisation of the past by creating a new society, 
one that was not burdened by the past. The political economy emphasised a domestic 
socialist policy and a non-aligned foreign policy.  
 
In retrospect, socialist central planning failed to achieve the goals of the 
revolution. The revolution faced internal and external struggles. Internally, the 
FRELIMO leadership underestimated class struggles with the peasantry, and used 
coercive tactics to rule, thus becoming repressive and an authoritarian regime. 
Chieftaincy was abolished, creating a vacuum that was manipulated by RENAMO to 
wage the war of destabilisation. Although RENAMO relied on the lack of traditional 
forms of governance, this was not the direct causal factor of the war. The war was a 
result of unsettled ethnic questions that arose to challenge the quest of an ethnic-free 
Mozambique by the Machel regime.  
 
Externally, several strategic relationships remained unclear. Mozambique was 
seen as a pariah state by Western countries which saw the continued support of South 
Africa to the rebel movement, RENAMO. Mozambique‟s aspirations to be part of the 
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Socialist bloc in a Cold War context achieved ambiguous results. Although Russia 
extended support to the Machel regime, this was insufficient to cement the democratic 
socialist revolution. This was further exacerbated by the fall of the Soviet Union, a 




MOZAMBIQUE‟S POST-CONFLICT POLITICAL 





The era of the “New Man” was replaced by experimentation with neo-liberal 
economic reforms and political liberalisation (liberal democracy) as a panacea for 
problems that were bequeathed by imperialism and colonialism in Mozambique. In 
1986, when Samora Machel died in a mysterious plane crash, a move towards 
political and economic reforms seemed inevitable. This chapter is a discussion of the 
challenges and opportunities in post-conflict Mozambique. Arndt notes that 
“[e]conomic collapse became inevitable in 1986, and a set of market-oriented policies 
was formulated under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank” (1999: 4). This 
chapter will delve into the debates about whether political and economic reforms 
implemented so far have had the desired results in terms of stabilising and adjusting 
one of the poorest countries in the world and whether a sound foundation for future 
growth has been established. Since the inception of political and economic reforms, 
the World Bank and IMF have reported that development in Mozambique has been 
revolutionary. The first section deals with the political context when the GPA was 
concluded. The dilemmas and challenges of democratisation are highlighted. The 
section following that is a discussion on the economic dilemmas.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide literature that contests the view that 
Mozambique is a success story, as neo-liberals have claimed. It is argued in this 
chapter that Mozambique has become too aid-dependent, as was the case in the final 
declining stages of the democratic socialist revolution. Of vital importance to this 
discussion is the emergence of the critical account of neo-liberalism in its present 
form and debates around this. The sixteen-year post-conflict period will be divided 
into two phases: 19922002 and 20032009. The period 19922002 is filled with 
landmark events; the first decade of democratic reforms began with the signing of the 
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GPA in 1992 and includes the holding of two elections in 1994 and 1999, culminating 
with the tenth anniversary of the Peace Agreement in 2002. The period 20032009, 
marks the second generation of political and economic reforms and democratic 
consolidation. Elections were held in 2004, with FRELIMO winning a convincing 
victory. This period is also marked by massive aid injections by donor governments 
and debt cancellation in 2005. It culminates in the holding of a fourth democratic 
election in 2009, which FRELIMO controversially won. 
 
3.1.1. Post-Conflict Political Transformation: The Tortuous Road to 
Democratisation (19922002)  
 
The protracted civil war came to an end when the GPA was signed in 1992, 
and Joaquim Chissano was elected President in 1994. In the new dispensation, 
FRELIMO retained government control, while the former rebel movement, 
RENAMO, became the main opposition party. The transition to democracy in 
Mozambique was also precipitated by fundamental changes in, what many scholars 
have argued, was a benign international political environment. The collapse of Soviet 
Russia and the demise of apartheid in South Africa removed many of the external 
economic and political forces that were behind the devastating internal strife of 
Mozambique during the 1980s.   
 
Various explanations are given on how Mozambique was able to move from a 
bitter conflict to democratisation. Some scholars and practitioners point to the 
international context and the role played by ONUMOZ. This position credits the 
United Nations with having played a central role because it was willing to contribute a 
large number of peacekeeping troops and financial resources to manage 
demobilisation and elections in Mozambique. The UN operation in Mozambique cost 
$700 million and involved 6239 troops. Walter (1999), in particular, writes that the 
presence of a large UN force presented a credible commitment that the provisions of 
the peace accord would be held. Yet focusing solely on the United Nations ignores the 
complexities that the GPA was a fragile agreement. As Walter points out: “The 
political guarantees gave RENAMO confidence that it would challenge the 
government, the military guarantee made RENAMO feel safe, and the territorial 
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guarantees of a dual administration prevented RENAMO‟s obsolescence” (1999:150). 
Dennis Jett, former U.S. ambassador to Mozambique during the implementation 
period, reflects that a more complete operation would entail that the UN remain 




Other scholars and other practitioners suggest that weak internal and external 
resources and support for Mozambique‟s civil war at the time helped to bring the war 
to an end and a political settlement ensued. For example, Hume notes: 
 
Although this conflict had international and regional connections, it was 
fundamentally a domestic conflict fought by Mozambicans. National identity was not 
an issue: both sides at least agreed on being Mozambicans. The argument was over 
who should govern and how they should govern (1994: 144).  
 
Further, Hume argues that “[t]he international factors affecting the conflict 
became favourable to a settlement, and President Mugabe, once FRELIMO‟s 
comrade-in-arms, eventually became the senior statesman supporting the peace 
process” (1994: 144). Yet this view also widens the chasm to understanding the 
transition; as Bekoe, argues differently, offering a new perspective on the 
Mozambican political settlement. She notes that both positions miss the essence of the 
implementation period in Mozambique by not drawing out the mechanisms by which 
the parties continued to negotiate with each other in the absence or weakness of 
institutions (2008: 26).  
 
If a peaceful political settlement was a quintessential position that both parties 
were aspiring towards, this merits close examination with particular reference to post-
conflict democratisation. Indeed, how did RENAMO, a guerrilla movement best 
known both inside and outside of Mozambique as an organisation “without a political 
program”
10
, sustained by external support and an army of captives, complete its 
transformations into a political party in time for the country‟s first multiparty 
elections and agree to a negotiated settlement? While Hume marvels at the fact that 
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 Dennis Jett, telephone interview (September 26, 2001) with Dorina A. Bekoe in Implementing Peace 
Agreements: Lessons from Mozambique, Angola, and Liberia (2008) 
10
 Roland Paris notes that this rebel organisation aimed to undermine the FRELIMO government, but 
beyond that goal, it lacked a political programme and received little encouragement from the 
population within Mozambique. At war’s end: building peace after civil conflict. (New York : 
Cambridge University Press, 2004)  
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the conflicting parties “throughout the peace process, emphasized that their goal was 
reconciliation among Mozambicans as peace could not be built on the basis of a 
victory of one party over the other” (1994: 144), this position is contested in the 
literature. Hume notes that “RENAMO showed dissatisfaction on a number of critical 
points” (ibid.). The nature of dissatisfaction is articulated by Mazula who notes that 
despite the desire of peace for both FRELIMO and RENAMO was marked by 
mistrust.  
 …Enormous and reciprocal, but it came very strongly from RENAMO which did not 
want to fall into the trap of integration […] the strategy through which FRELIMO 
had wanted for years to assimilate RENAMO [offering amnesty to those subduing to 
the government] not giving it any political worth (1996). 
 
Dhlakama, the RENAMO leader, pushed on creating a government of national 
unity highlighting how losers would be treated in the new system. Bekoe further 
suggests that it was one thing for the GPA to state that Mozambique would use a 
system of proportional representation or permit RENAMO to hold on to some of its 
territory, however, this did not mean that RENAMO would be able both to influence 
policy and prevent adverse policies (2008: 28). Bekoe disagrees with the position that 
asserts that democratisation was simply influenced by international factors and 
internal weak structures. She suggests that this position “takes the provisions of the 
GPA for granted and does not assess the degree of mutual political and military 
vulnerability that characterized the implementation period” (2008: 28).  
 
The peace agreement provided a platform where democratic contestations 
could be forged. The strength of the GPA, as Bekoe suggests, “lies in the political 
reform that recognizes RENAMO as a legitimate political party and the adoption of 
electoral and administrative rules that allow it to exist as an effective political party” 
(2008: 29). However, as Alden has argued, this has resulted in democratic elections 
being tied to a structure that favours the ruling party in power and, as has become 
clearer with each election, allowed FRELIMO to conduct domestic and foreign policy 
without any reference to opposition concerns (2006: 156). Alden further suggests: 
“More concerted international effort to question and critique the 1990 constitution, 
especially in the context of severe displeasure on the part of RENAMO during the 
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peace talks, would have limited the scope for the kind of „democratic 
authoritarianism‟ that precipitated the 1999 crisis
11
” (ibid.).    
 
3.1.2. Democratisation: Towards Consolidation (20022009) 
 
The Peace Agreement in Mozambique opened a new opportunity for 
democratic governance to be enhanced. During the Cold War period, Western 
governments supported authoritarian regimes that repressed people in order to 
promote geo-strategic interests. Manning notes that “democratization is the dynamic, 
nonlinear process through which previously warring elites gradually arrive at an 
acceptable long-term political settlement” (2002: 5). As previously pointed out, in 
Mozambique, however, there was distrust mixed with uncertainty about the political 
future being agreed upon. Whereas the philosophy that underpinned the peace deal 
was conciliatory, Mazula argues that the “GPA sought to avoid the re-establishment 
of authoritarian regimes which tend to forget history and distort its analysis” (1996: 
32).  
 
Cabaco (1996) and Manning (2002) pick up this argument from where most 
analysts on Mozambique stop. Both Cabaco (1996) and Mazula (1996) agree that 
exclusionary measures adopted by the FRELIMO government have ensured that 
democratic institutions that are being forged in this young democracy reflect the 
interests of the ruling party. For example, both Cabaco and Mazula suggest that, the 
Assembly of the Republic is the only possible forum for sharing power with the 
opposition. Political opposition parties remain organisationally weak and financially 
dependent upon a meager state subsidy. Given this backdrop, Manning notes that 
Mozambique‟s governance structures are dominated by the ruling oligarchs.  
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 In 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections, disputes arose between FRELIMO and RENAMO. 
The ruling party was accused of manipulating votes and lacking transparency, leading RENAMO to 
complain about the ballot counting rules. Electoral reforms passed had emphasised transparency. These 
critical reforms allowed the participation of electoral observers. RENAMO felt that reforms had been 
manipulated to suit the continued dominance of FRELIMO. This was preceded by RENAMO‟s boycott 
of the local elections in 1998, and resurfaced during the general election.  
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New analysis, as Hanlon has argued, suggests that “FRELIMO is almost 
unique in its post-independence ability to stay totally organizationally united and yet 
remain so diverse on key issues” (2008; 96). This is a move that can be traced to the 
succession of leadership within FRELIMO party structures. After Mondlane‟s death, 
Samora Machel legitimately ascended to power. In 1986, when Samora Machel died, 
Joaquim Chissanno came to power in a move that ensured that party structures are 
open to the fluidity and mobility of leadership within FRELIMO. This does not, 
however, mean that democratic practice has been entrenched. Party members called 
for reform in the 2004 election, which led to Joaquim Chissano being replaced as 
party leader and presidential candidate. This has manifested in debates in which the 
old guard has been highly critical of FRELIMO as a corrupt political party. According 
to Hanlon corruption and nepotism are deeply entrenched in party structures. He 
suggests the following: 
 
During elections, party workers are always shocked at the way corruption 
antagonizes voters and traditional FRELIMO supporters. Honest members and 
leaders stayed within the party and opted for internal reform, which led to Chissano 
being ousted as party leader and presidential candidate…Yet Chissano remains in the 
party, on the Political Commission, and powerful. The other side of the coin is that 
some of Chissano‟s notoriously corrupt allies also remain in the party, in some cases 
with well-paid sinecures, and with the justice system manipulated to ensure that they 
are never prosecuted (2008: 96).  
 
In spite of having experienced the first decade of „successful‟ peace and 
pluralistic politics, this relatively unruffled surface of Mozambican politics masks 
serious weaknesses. According to Abrahamsson and Nilsson, “at the sixth party 
congress FRELIMO abandoned its role as a Marxist-Lennist avant-garde” (1995: 
110). In light of that shift Manning asserts that  
 
[f]or FRELIMO, over the years a weakened emphasis on ideology has facilitated the 
spread of corruption within the party and has hurt the party‟s image in the eyes of the 
Mozambican citizens. With the creep of corruption the party has lost one of the 
things that made it distinctive in the eyes of the Mozambican citizens, whether party 
supporters or not (2002: 133).  
 
 Democracies exist as tapestries of the contestations of citizenship. The Peace 
Agreement paved a way toward liberal democratic practices, where individual 
freedoms would be ushered in Mozambique. It was an assumption by international 
peace negotiators, FRELIMO and the belligerents, in Rome, that the process of 
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democratization would promote political stability and national reconciliation. 
Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique was repressive. The Machel regime, on the 
contrary, worked toward the removal of barriers of repressive colonial rule. 
FRELIMO promoted the election of local officials and, as Hanlon suggests, “the 
holding of elections when people in public meetings voted to accept or reject 
candidates put forward by the party for local councils” (2008: 90).  
 
However, in the present system there are certain practices that have not been 
questioned. Ideally, citizens should enhance civil and economic liberties, a point that 
resonates with both Mafeje and Ake. The holding of elections is not synonymous with 
democratic consolidation. It can be argued that participation in the political process 
and an interaction between citizens and government go far beyond voting every few 
years. A liberal democracy is insufficient to deal with governance weaknesses and 
structural legacies with which Mozambique is burdened. What is needed is a social 
democracy which is committed to justice and fairness and an emphasis on meeting 
polarised social conditions such as lack of housing, access to healthcare and 
addressing rural poverty. In Mozambique, democratic consolidation has left 
unanswered questions for local observers and international policy-makers alike. It 
merits a re-emphasis, as re-iterated by Alden:  
 
Mozambique remains in certain crucial respects an unconsolidated democracy built 
upon a fragile economic base. FRELIMO has had an unbroken hold of the levers of 
power for thirty years, though since 1994 through the ballot box (and with 
manipulation where necessary) thus disallowing the possibility of opposition 
challenges in the management of the country‟s affairs (2006: 163).  
 
Few options existed for Mozambique other than to adopt democracy. In the 
post-Cold War period, a belief in democracy as a panacea for solving the ills of 
authoritarianism and the legacies of dictatorships in Africa surfaced. Nevertheless, 
myriad questions are raised pertaining to democratisation in Mozambique, particularly 
with reference to FRELIMO‟s ability to deal with nepotism, corruption and deliver on 
socio-economic goals that can place the country on a path of change. Further 
questions are raised as to whether democracy can, in fact, make a contribution to the 
resolution of internal strife in Mozambique. How might democratic institutions 
address the special problems of civil wars, particularly in a country like Mozambique 
where successful democratisation was highly unlikely in any case? Democratisation 
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was in tandem with economic reforms that would cement the needed social change as 
suggested by the international community. The next section deals with these debates. 
Mozambique has continued to experience questionable political stability. To this end, 
Vuax et al.‟s analysis is crucial: 
 
Despite the appearance of a multi-party state, in practice Mozambique is controlled 
by an oligarchy within the party which purchases support through patronage, much of 
which derives from aid. … The trend is toward centralization and consolidation of 
power with a narrow elite, which will be obliged to offer patronage to a wide and 
„greedy‟ circle of clients. … Relations based on extended families (and in some cases 
ethnic affiliations) determine access to state resources and political power. … Behind 
all this is a murky world of financial relationships and trade-offs. … Mozambique is 
moving in the direction of being a single party state, or perhaps something like a 
royal court in which favour and advancement depend on informal relationships. 
(2006: 3).  
 
3.2. Theoretical Contestations: Locating Mozambique in the debates 
of Neo-liberalism  
 
The World Bank in 2007 talked of Mozambique‟s „blistering pace of 
economic growth‟ (2007). A joint donor-government study in early 2007 said: 
“Mozambique is generally considered an aid success story” (KPMG, 2007: 46). The 
IMF in early 2007 said: “Mozambique is a success story in Sub-Saharan Africa” 
(2007: 4). However, the success story presents paradoxes. Despite economic growth, 
inequalities have increased, leaving the poor and vulnerable without safety nets and 
escaping the trapping of poverty. In the same way, although the government has 
received more aid for health care coverage, diseases such as malaria, HIV/AIDS and 
TB have haunted the post-conflict state. In the same light, infant mortality and child 
malnutrition have substantially increased even when compared with other post-
conflict societies and developing countries. The following section will provide a 
theoretical discussion to locate post-conflict Mozambique.    
 
As previously pointed out, Alavi‟s analysis highlighted that the trappings of 
global capitalism were incapable of ushering in revolutionary change needed in 
developing societies. On the contrary, Hyden has suggested that the embracing of 
capitalism (free market principles) would usher in revolutionary change in Africa. 
Mozambique, can be located within these debates. The evolution of development 
theories in the 20
th
 century culminated in different schools of thought. Radical 
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Marxists advocated the abolition of capitalism, whilst radical market fundamentalists 
insisted on capitalism as the only viable alternative to bring about political and 
economic change. Throughout the 20
th
 century, particularly at the peak of the Cold 
War period, polarised relations intensified debates on a command economy versus a 
free market economic system.  
 
Development economics and, to a larger extent, Development Studies, were 
influenced by neo-classical economic thinking. For example, as soon as African 
countries gained independence in the 1960s, they relied on the assistance of former 
colonial masters‟ expatriates to provide logistical support (Cooper 2002). Economists 
provided logical support, devising policies that emphasized  the export of agricultural 
exports on the global market (Cooper 2002). As previously mentioned, Mozambique, 
for example, relied on Soviet support to plan development projects and the 
modernisation of agriculture. In neo-classical thinking, however, the state was 
sidelined as a vehicle of ushering in change, and a market society was encouraged. 
The triumph of the market as an alternative to socialist central planning was 
announced in the 1980s. The election of Ronald Reagan in the US and Margaret 
Thatcher in Britain also signified a shift in ideology, which culminated in what is 
known as Reaganomics and Thatcherism. The term used to popularise Reaganomics 
and Thatcherism was the Washington Consensus, as leading IFIs such as the World 
Bank, IMF, and WTO, intensified political and economic liberalisation as a means of 
achieving development.  
 
The complete implementation of neo-liberal policies coincided with the 
sudden fall and failure of the Socialist bloc to compete in the global capitalist 
economy. As Moses Naim contends: “The ideas derived from the Washington 
Consensus had a huge influence on the economic reforms of many countries” (2000: 
89). The Washington Consensus revolved around the following pillars: fiscal 
discipline, public expenditure priorities, tax reform, exchange rates, trade 
liberalisation, foreign direct investment, privatisation, deregulation and the 
enforcement of property rights. And, as Dambisa Moyo (2009) has expounded, the 
Washington Consensus entailed a minimised role of the state, privatising previously 
nationalised industries, liberalising trade and dramatically reducing the civil service.   
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Naim has argued that the Washington Consensus was the conventional 
wisdom among the economically influential parts of Washington, meaning the US 
government and the IFI (2000: 507). As Summer suggests, the “vehicle—policy—for 
the IFI Washington Consensus was privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation. The 
point of arrival was economic growth and macroeconomic stability as ends in 
themselves (low inflation, balance of payments and fiscal equilibrium, etc.) (2006: 
1402). These ideas became „meta-narrative‟ in themselves, and soon acquired a life of 
their own, becoming a brand name known worldwide and used independently of its 
original intent. Both the World Bank and the IMF launched austere measures and aid 
initiatives on poor countries to institute the IMF‟s SAP and enhanced Structural 
Adjustment facilities.    
 
The Consensus was popularised by John Williamson (1989), who was a World 
Bank economic advisor for Latin America. The policies in the Consensus were 
supposed to be a blueprint plan to rid Latin-American economies of hyperinflation 
and place these countries on a trajectory of economic prosperity and growth. 
However, contrary to conventional wisdom, the relative simplicity and presumed 
reliability of the Washington Consensus policies were not reflected in the experience 
with market reforms for most of the developing world in the 1990s. It was clear that, 
as Naim suggests,  
 
[p]olicy makers often implemented an incomplete version of the model, and the 
results were quite different from what politicians had promised, the people had 
expected, and the IMF and World Bank‟s econometric models had predicted (2000: 
504).  
 
Sumner further notes that “[w]ithin these policies some might have been 
surprised to see progressive taxation, welfare systems (albeit non-deficit financed) and 
institutional reform” (2006: 1403). However, Kanbur argues that the Consensus, as 
practiced by the IFI became “„state-bashing‟—a wholesale attempt to dismantle the 
developmental state” (1999). Furthermore Sumner argues,  
 
key „anomalies‟ included assumptions that markets are perfectly competitive; 
development defined as economic development; methodological individualism; 
utility maximization; equilibrium as an organic concept and efficiency as a goal ( 
2006: 1403).  
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The recognition of the failure of these policies in Africa led to an ideological 
backlash, with African intellectuals beginning to advocate for a „democratic 
developmental state‟ to safeguard political and economic development.  
 
The failure of market-led reforms under the auspices of Washington 
Consensus was common throughout the continent. Most countries were coerced into 
agreeing to the terms and conditions of the policies. However, recent global events 
have placed questions on the meaning of capitalism, and their implications on the 
development debate are immense. In late 2008, the economies of the developed world 
were in recession as a result of the subprime and credit crunch crises. Since the „crisis 
of capitalism‟ and possible demise of the Washington Consensus, policy discourse has 
been driven by the concept of a post-Washington Consensus which is primarily 
associated with Joseph Stiglitz‟s work. The former World Bank President, James 
Wolfnsohn, observed that „the Washington Consensus had been replaced by all sorts 
of other consensuses” (World Bank, 1998). This phase of the debate, however, is 
driven by disenchanted views, primarily critiquing the Washington Consensus as 
practiced by the IFIs, rather than by a new paradigm. Sumner further suggests that  
 
Stiglitz has argued that the Washington Consensus was „incomplete‟ and 
„misleading‟ and that there was a lack of understanding of economic structures (too 
unrealistic ontological assumptions), a narrow set of objectives (too economic) and a 
narrow set of policy instruments (too limited) (2006: 1404).  
 
However, many have argued that minute differences exist between the post-
Washington Consensus and the Consensus itself. Perraton has suggested that the 
difference was „rather less than the rhetoric suggests‟, and has noted that Stiglitz only 
repudiates fiscal discipline, and liberalisation of the capital account and rate of interest 
(2006: 897-906). Dani Rodrik went as far as to label the post-Washington Consensus 
„unfeasible, inappropriate and irrelevant‟ and dubbed it the „augmented-Washington 
Consensus‟, arguing that it describes the desirable features of development but not 
how to get to them, and added ten policies to Williamson‟s original list to form the 
„augmented Washington Consensus‟(2002). Beeson and Islam called the post-
Washington Consensus the reinvention of global neo-liberalism under the guise of an 
“augmented Washington Consensus” (1999). The debates are thus polarised and in 
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addition, have largely ignored the African perspective and the developmental 
challenges that African countries face. 
 
This deficiency in the debates led to a process through which, Mafeje 
suggests, “African intellectuals felt obliged to defend the integrity and the autonomy 
of the African state and the right to choose its own path of development” (2002: 8). In 
a slightly different fashion, Ake and Moyo debunk the current international 
development model promoted by the World Bank and IMF. On the wider spectrum, 
Ake suggests that “political authoritarianism is an important reason why the 
development project in Africa has not been able to take off” (1996: 129). He thus sees 
intense democratisation and political decentralisation as the only viable alternative 
that will transform agrarian African states into economic powerhouses. Ake echoes 
Mafeje‟s quest for self-reliance and suggests: 
 
In the past self-reliance has been largely a source against foreign domination, a 
protest against being dependent and in the control of foreigners. This concept is 
pertinent, but it misses the crucial point of self-reliance. … In the context of 
development, self-reliance is about a responsibility of producing a development 
project as well as providing the resources to carry it through. The primary principle 
of development strategy in Africa is that people have to be the agents, the means, and 
ends of development. (1996: 140)  
 
In similar vein, Dambisa Moyo, a Zambian national and former World Bank 
economist, has illustrated in her latest book, Dead Aid, how the way in which over-
reliance on aid has trapped developing nations in a vicious circle of dependency, 
corruption, market distortion, and further poverty, leaving them with nothing but the 
“need” for more aid. Moyo clearly outlines how ways of financing development in 
Africa should be changed, taking into account Africa‟s inability to attract capital 
flows. Moyo challenges the assumptions and arguments that support a profoundly 
misguided development policy in Africa. She suggests that education, innovation and 
entrepreneurship will be a currency for success in 21
st
-century Africa. In her book, she 
offers a bold road map for financing development for the world‟s poorest countries 
that guarantees economic growth and a significant decline in poverty, without reliance 
on foreign aid or aid-related assistance. Moyo has argued that,  
although aid is meant to encourage private investment by providing loan guarantees, 
subsidising investment risks and supporting co-financing arrangements with private 
investors, in practice it discourages the inflow of such high-quality foreign monies 
(2009: 61).  
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Moyo further argues that the goals of aid, as originally set out by the founders 
like Harry Truman (US leadership) and John Maynard Keynes in the New Hampshire 
hotel after the end of the Second World War, were sustainable economic growth and 
poverty alleviation, and it is against these goals that aid should be judged, and against 
these that it has spectacularly failed (2009: 150). She proposes that African countries 
firstly need to develop a solid economic plan that seeks to reduce aid dependency. 
This, she argues, can be achieved by raising bonds and manipulating market 
mechanisms to bring about trade, FDI and intense capital liquidity through micro-
finance and savings. Secondly, Moyo proposes that African countries need to enforce 
rules of prudence and not live beyond their means. And finally, she proposes that the 
third stage in the Dead Aid model should work toward strengthening institutions. This 
entails not relying on the same tactics that were cemented by the austere policies of 
the IMF but a strong commitment to building indigenous political and financial 
institutions that work to serve the goals of reducing poverty and inequality.  
 
On the contrary, Samir Amin (2006) challenges the misguided positions of the 
development paradigm and envisions a world beyond US hegemony and global 
capitalism. Throughout his works, Amin (1997) asserts that nations want 
independence and dignity and that the logic of capital produces the opposite. As Marx 
had predicted, capitalism sows the seeds of its own destruction, and its unilateral logic 
produces unemployment, impoverishment, and marginalisation. Critical of the 
obsession with market fundamentalism, Amin (2006) insists that imposed blueprint 
plans as panaceas for socioeconomic conditions in Africa were considerably more a 
destructive illusion that deregulated capitalism would ensure „better‟ development 
(2006: 117). Amin (2006) suggests that there is a need for mutual adjustments among 
the great, unevenly developed regions of the world, adjustments based on collective 
negotiation that make global interdependence fit the requirements of national and 
regional strategies, while taking into account the inequalities inherited from 
polarisation (2006: 107). And Amin further suggests “that an alternative to capitalist 
globalization, implies the recomposition of socialist perspectives in all different parts 
of the world” (1997: 76).  
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3.2.1. The case of Mozambique  
 
In retrospect, looking at the situation in Mozambique, certain factors should 
not be overlooked, particularly the interplay of international economic policy on the 
domestic economy in the 1980s as Mozambique became a member of the BWI. This 
cannot be divorced from the wider debates that are taking place on the continent. 
Throughout the continent, the question whether globalisation has failed Africa or 
whether political and economic reforms have unequivocally failed is being debated. 
What is clear, as Stiglitz suggests, is that there is disappointment in the policies that 
have been pushed for the past two decades: the policies focusing on liberalisation, 
privatisation and stabilisation. If Mozambique is a „success story‟ as neo-liberals 
claim, any attempt to evaluate this yardstick should take into account the political and 
economic restructuring that has happened since the collapse of the command 
economy. And, as Stiglitz adamantly contends, “the reforms were supported too by 
free market fundamentalist ideologues, and they will continue to proclaim the success, 
whatever the evidence with which they are confronted” (2002: 12-14). 
 
Hence, for a country like Mozambique, post-conflict political and economic 
reconstruction takes place in an era where clear answers are not found in the post-
Washington Consensus paradigm. This is further supported by a polarised version that 
is present in current debates. The thinking in a post-Washington Consensus is that low 
income countries characterised by „poor‟ and „weak‟ institutions can arrive at 
development by achieving economic growth and poverty reduction, sustainable 
development, equity and democracy. The underlying assumption is that through 
institutional strengthening, regulatory structures, macroeconomic stability, strong 
financial systems, privatisation with competition, human capital formation, property 
rights, cautious integration, social safety nets, and technology policy, progress can be 
achieved. (Stiglitz, 1998; 2002; 2004; 2006) 
 
On the contrary, The New York Consensus or Millennium „Meta-Narrative‟ 
assumes that for poverty-trapped low income countries, inequality and poverty 
„pockets‟ in middle income countries, both the result of „governance‟ failures, can be 
combated by achieving the Millennium Development Goals. In a slightly different 
57 
fashion, the underlying assumption is that growth, trade openness, aid, prioritising 
public expenditure, and good „governance‟, will place developing countries on a 
trajectory of economic development. This view is expounded by Maxwell who notes 
that the Washington Consensus has been replaced by a new and improved orthodoxy, 
called here the „meta-narrative‟.  
 
It emphasises the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as an over-arching 
framework, and lays out the link between MDGs, nationally owned poverty reduction 
strategies, macro-economic policy (including trade), effective public expenditure 
management, and harmonized aid in support of good governance and good 
policies(2005: 1-2).  
 
3.2.2. Mozambique‟s Post-conflict Economic Growth  
 
 Research suggests that the incidence and severity of conflicts in Africa have 
had a negative effect on the growth rate of income. For instance, World Bank data 
show that countries in Africa which experienced civil wars had an average income 50 
percent lower than that of countries that experienced no civil war (World Bank, 2007: 
126). Collier and Hoeffler estimate that one year of conflict reduces the country‟s 
growth rate by 2.2 percent. Collier and Hoeffler further argue that military 
expenditure (as percentage of GDP) rises by 1.8 percent during the war but declines 
by only 0.5 percent post-conflict. If war lasts for ten years, post-conflict, the cost is on 
average 18 percent of GDP (2002: 13-28). 
 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, Mozambique presents a peculiar case to 
post-conflict economic reconstruction. The World Bank reports:  
 
The economic losses to Mozambique because of the war were $15 billion, four times 
the 1988 GDP. In addition to the destruction of roads, approximately 45 percent of 
schools had been destroyed or closed by the end of 1987. By 1993, 48 percent of the 
total number of health posts had been destroyed” (2007: 138).  
 
The country emerged from a devastating war and enormously underdeveloped 
to a country that has attracted investments and achieved average annual growth of 8% 
(The World Bank: 2007). Furthermore, a Standard Bank research reports suggests that 
Mozambique has held the position of donor darling, manifested in generous donor 
inflows to support the budget and other social priority projects. The achievement of 
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macroeconomic stability has attracted capital inflows and improved the accessibility 
of commercial lenders (2007). The report further notes that the economy 
 
is estimated to have grown slightly faster in 2006, 7.9 percent, after the drought year 
of 2005 when it expanded by 7.7 percent. Economic activity in 2006 was largely due 
to the recovery of the agricultural sector following the return of good rains and 
construction, agriculture generates almost a quarter of Mozambique‟s gross national 
product (Standard Bank, 2007). 
 
3.2.3. Aid Dependency          
 
In spite of the acclaimed double digit growth figures since the late 1990s up to 
the present, Mozambique remains a country dominated by grinding poverty and 
deprivation. Alden states that Mozambique has been under an internationally-imposed 
SAP since 1987 that encourages wholesale privatisation of state enterprises and 
foreign investment as a solution to the country‟s severe economic problems (2006: 
156). Addison, Geda, et al. have further suggested that in Mozambique  
 
[p]owerful elites straddle the public and private sectors; the business interests of 
political elites are significant influence on the decision to liberalise and privatise the 
banking systems, and new private banks have gone out of their way to recruit 
political elites to their boards (2001, 9). 
 
 Commentators have argued that, aid dependency has encouraged rent-seeking 
behaviour amongst the ruling elite and thus has curtailed Mozambique‟s sovereignty 
in policy in the development process.  Castel-Branco‟s analysis of these developments 
have led him to label Mozambique as a country that has not owned the development 
process. Understood in this light, ownership is a useful concept to the articulation of 
self-reliance as advocated by Pan-Africanist scholars like Amin and Mafeje. Castel-
Branco suggests that in its purest forms, ownership, in the context of aid dependency, 
means that aid-recipient agency defines its own political agenda and programme 
independently of its sources of finance (external aid); and highlights three points that 
are crucial to the study: (i) donor agencies have no influence on the political agenda of 
the recipient agency other than financing it; (ii) donors have no clear policy 
preferences, or do not express them if they have them, therefore, they make aid 
available irrespective of policy choices made by the recipient, in an untied, 
unconditional and un-earmarked manner; and (iii) the recipient agency is fully 
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informed and has homogenous interests about policy options and preference, such that 
policy choices and decisions reflect uncontested ownership.    
 
Castel-Branco argues that “[d]espite the macro-economic improvements, 
Mozambique remains a country dependent on huge annual injections of foreign grants 
and soft loans” (2008: 34). The government collects enough domestic revenue to 
cover its running costs, but the capital budget is almost entirely funded by foreign aid. 
As Paul Fauvet further suggests:  
 
These multilateral creditors IMF and World Bank exercise significant policy leverage 
through their lending. If donors are not satisfied with Mozambique‟s implementation 
of IMF/World Bank programmes, they can suspend lending, which in turn endangers 
funds from bilateral sources (2000: 5-7).  
 
In responding to a parliamentary debate, the former Prime Minister, Mocumbi, 
acknowledged that the government is taking orders from foreigners. Mocumbi 
suggested that Mozambique is a country that begs, and beggars have their sovereignty 
curtailed.”
12
. Castel-Branco further suggests that the social, economic and 
technological structure of production and trade (including exports) became even 
narrower than before and, as a consequence, the Mozambican economy is more 
vulnerable and has fewer development options (Castel-Branco 2004a, 2004b, 2003, 
2002a, 2002b, and 1999, Castel-Branco, Suleman, et al., 2005). 
 
While there has been improved economic growth since the ending of the 
conflict, it is difficult to say whether this is attributable to peace itself or to the overall 
benefits of the SAP. As Castel-Branco (2008) emphasises, aid dependency is 
multidimensional when it affects the institutional culture, thinking, policies and 
options of the systems of governance, as well as the interactions between agents, 
public policy options, the financing of such policies. Thus the multidimensional 
nature of aid-dependency means that dependency goes beyond basic resources (public 
finance, foreign exchange, savings) and basic capacities (technical, managerial) to 
include many other aspects of life. Economic success as claimed by neo-liberals has 
led to a social backlash, resulting in increased levels of inequality, diseases such as 
                                                 
12
 Fauvet quotes the Prime Minister of Mozambique to drive the point of donor dependence and loss of 
„sovereignty‟ on regulating domestic economic policy. 
60 
malaria and tuberculosis, corruption and armed attacks, particularly in the rural areas 
of Mozambique. As Paris (2004) has argued, this pattern appears to be playing itself 
out as ex-combatants and ordinary peasants have responded to declining living 
standards by joining the ranks of criminal gangs. Whether Mozambique continues to 
live up to its reputation as a peacebuilding success story remains to be seen. 
 
Economic liberalisation policies have also been beneficial in most ways 
―most notably, by contributing to high levels of GNP growth and encouraging new 
flows of foreign investment. However, as Paris has further argued, the same economic 
reforms have also deepened existing schisms and traditional sources of political 
tension in the country and have apparently contributed to the spread of violence which 
at least casts doubt on the neo-liberal peace thesis which claims that political and 
economic liberalisation promotes stable and lasting peace, even in what is generally 
viewed as one of the most successful cases of peacebuilding in the 1990s (2004: 147).  
 
In a different vein, Castel-Branco sheds light on what was previously 
discussed by Pan-Africanist scholars providing solutions to the development impasse. 
As a result of increased net flow of capital through development aid and FDI, 
Mozambique has not become self-reliant. As Castel-Branco himself notes:  
 
Aid dependency is structural when the basic functions of the state and society are aid 
dependent; aid dependency is dynamic when the pattern of development that is 
structurally and multidimensionally aid dependent generates new and deeper aid 
dependencies, rather than reducing aid dependency over a period of time (2008: 33). 
 
Development aid has not been revolutionary in Mozambique. The purpose of 
sustainable growth is to generate a functioning machinery that can deliver social 
policy goals. Capitalist growth can be used to collect revenues that are purposeful to 
increase investments in agricultural production, healthcare and infrastructure 
development. In Mozambique the opposite has happened. Over-reliance on aid and 
foreign expertise has meant that the development path and goals are in line with neo-
liberal ideals. It goes against the „New Man‟ principles which Machel had envisaged, 
and thus will form a point of critical discussion in the next chapter on data analysis.    
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3.3. Conclusion  
 
International stakeholders played a crucial role in bringing about peace in 
Mozambique. Post-conflict peace paved a way for democratisation, allowing the new 
regime to champion political pluralism and a move toward a market society. As a 
result of a negotiated democratic transition FRELIMO won the elections in 1994 and 
has subsequently continued to win convincingly, though with questionable results. 
This political space has been filled with the rhetoric of contestation, as RENAMO has 
attempted to position itself as a robust opposition. The analysis reveals, as Chakravati 
contends, that in Mozambique there is potential for a more robust authoritarianism 
just below the surface (2005: 148). Participation in a democracy is an organic 
overflow of entrenched democratic institutions in which citizens are given the voices 
to participate in the future direction of Mozambique. Both Mafeje and Ake, with 
every prophetic insight, warned that for African countries to move forward, self-
reliance should be the cornerstone of development policies. However, political 
plurality has not been guarded in Mozambique‟s new democracy. 
  
A closer examination of Mozambique‟s post-conflict political economy also 
reveals structural legacies bequeathed by colonialism and FRELIMO‟s one-party rule 
between 1975 and 1992. Economically, Mozambique remains an aid-dependent 
economy. Donors have taken a genuine interest in resuscitating the economy and have 
refrained from questioning some of the contradictions and paradoxes that characterise 
the „success story‟. As Chakravati further argues:  
 
Part of the problem is probably that, at a political level, multilateral institutions and 
bilateral donors, including the US government, do not want to be too critical, because 
at the present time, it is one of the few well-performing economies in Africa (2005: 
148).  
 
The central thesis of the study has so far been that the current development 
model needs to be questioned. The analysis so far highlights that success has been 
accompanied by a backlash. Mozambique remains a fragile peace agreement, and 
raises the question whether growth has been accompanied by equity. In light of these 
views, the next chapter will critically analyse data on aid and human development to 
challenge the prevailing development orthodoxy.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 




 This chapter provides an assessment of the development path in post-conflict 
Mozambique by analysing quantitative data collected. The data include levels of aid, 
food security and social indicators, such as, health and corruption, a governance issue 
which is directly linked to change and progress. In Chapter Three, the literature 
review argued that Mozambique‟s post-conflict political economy has become aid-
dependent resulting in growth. This claim needs to be substantiated with empirical 
evidence. The post-conflict peace agreement paved a way through which political and 
economic reforms were supposed to improve the conditions of people in 
Mozambique. These reforms were in tandem with the shift of thinking in the post-
Cold War period by virtue of which donor governments placed an emphasis on human 
security and governance as desired ideals that democratic governments should uphold. 
 
Since the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992, emphasis was 
placed on how democratic Mozambique could best deliver on social goals, such as the 
reduction of poverty and hunger, economic policies that would reduce inequality, and 
the creation of a thriving environment in which nascent democratic institutions could 
be nurtured. This study takes into account the fact that substantial improvement in 
these indicators does not necessarily translate into the improvement of the quality of 
life nor arrival at development, as defined in linear terms.  
 
4.1.1. Data  
 
The data used seek to illustrate empirical evidence that Mozambique is not a 
success story of post-conflict reform. As already indicated a huge portion of the data 
was sourced from the databases of leading international organisations, such as, the 
WHO, the World Bank, the OECD, FAO and TI to illustrate that the trajectory of 
post-conflict reforms warrants an appraisal.  
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The data were specifically chosen because these indicators can capture lived 
experiences of Mozambicans with regard to poverty, economic growth and 
development, and political change. The data also provide trends in the post-conflict 
period that allow the researcher to make inferences about the trajectory of 
Mozambique‟s post-conflict political economy. Data on Mozambique are difficult to 
find, and not all the important social indicators were available from these 
organisations for analysis. The African Development Indicators database, for 
example, had numerous variables on health and malnutrition missing. Furthermore, 
though it would have been useful to look at education indicators, data on school 
enrolment in the post-conflict period were missing. Despite this, the data collected can 
be used to assess government‟s and donors‟ claims about that Mozambique is a 
success story. It is important to clarify that this study does not reject the relevance of 
economic indicators as measures of development. 
 
FAO estimates the number of undernourished individuals using calculations of 
the amount of food available in each country and a measure of inequality in 
distribution derived from household income expenditure surveys. The statistical 
methods used to calculate the prevalence of undernourishment are reliable and well-
established. However, the underlying data sets used to create these estimates are of 
varying quality. Household food surveys are generally considered to be more accurate 
than food balance sheets in some circumstances, but these surveys are conducted 
sporadically and have in the past focused on food expenditure rather than on the 
caloric or nutritional content of food consumed. In addition, household surveys do not 
include food consumed in restaurants, hospitals, and other public establishments.  
 
Public health expenditure as a percentage of GDP is the capital spending from 
government (central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including 
donations from international agencies and nongovernmental organizations) and social 
(or compulsory) health insurance funds. Public health expenditure provides an 
assessment of a government's relative investment in healthcare. Data on health 
expenditure come mostly from the World Health Organization's (WHO) National 
Health Account database and from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) for its member countries, supplemented by World Bank 
poverty assessments and country and sector studies. Data are also drawn from World 
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Bank public expenditure reviews, the International Monetary Fund's Government 
Finance Statistics database, and other studies. 
 
Aid received is the amount of Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
received by a country. Aid refers to the actual international transfer by the donor of 
financial resources or of goods or services (valued at the cost to the donor), less any 
repayments of loan principal during the same period. Data are in million current U.S. 
dollars, converted at official exchange rates. ODA consists of loans and grants given 
to countries and territories on the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) list of 
aid recipients by multilateral organizations, DAC member countries, and non-DAC 
donors. They do not reflect aid given by recipient countries to other developing 
countries. As a result, some countries that are net donors (e.g., Saudi Arabia) are 
treated as aid recipients. Aid data do not distinguish among different types of aid 
(program, project, or food aid; emergency assistance; post-conflict peacekeeping 
assistance; or technical cooperation), each of which may have very different effects on 
the economy.   
 
Foreign direct investment net inflows represent long-term investment interest 
by a foreign direct investor in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that in 
which the investor is based. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, 
other long-term capital, and short-term capital. Data are reported in millions of current 
U.S. dollars. The data on foreign direct investment are based on balance of payments 
data reported by the IMF, supplemented by data on net foreign direct investment 
reported by the OECD and official national sources. 
 
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures the degree to which 
corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. Ratings range 
in value from 10 (least corrupt) to 0 (most corrupt). The survey measures public sector 
corruption or the abuse of public office for private gain. It measures local and national 
governments, not domestic and foreign corporations doing business in these countries. 
The CPI is a composite index compiled from surveys originating from different 
independent institutions. The CPI for 2006 was compiled from 12 surveys originating 
from 9 different independent institutions. A country is included in the CPI only if 
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there are data available from 3 or more surveys. The surveys measure the perceptions 
of local residents, expatriates, business people, academics and risk analysts.  
 
4.1.2. Measuring Development  
 
For decades development practitioners and policy makers alike have been 
debating on how development should be measured. Since the 1970s, global leaders 
and development practitioners realised that development measured through Gross 
National Product (GNP) should be questioned. Although the past two decades have 
witnessed a change in thinking, practitioners continue to measure development in 
ways that largely reflect aggregate changes such as GDP per capita, income poverty 
and inequality. As Neema Ndunguru has argued: “These development indicators have, 
however, largely ignored the effects that development interventions and economic 
changes have had on people on the micro-level” (2007: 141). Development thus 
becomes a process that involves political, economic and social contestations of 
progress and change, and how marginalised and privileged individuals interact with 
the institutions mentioned. Ultimately, a development model that alienates the voices 
of people is devoid of impacting constituencies it ought to serve. Alternative 
measurements, such as the Human Development Index (HDI), were therefore 
introduced.  
 
The UNDP launched the Human Development Report, which is an annual 
milestone publication, and has subsequently aimed at placing people at the centre of 
the development process in terms of economic debate, policy and advocacy. The ideas 
of the report had been pioneered by Pakistani economist Mahbub-ul-Haq and Indian 
economist Amartya Sen with an explicit goal to shift the focus of development 
economics from national income accounting to people-centred policies. In subsequent 
years, the degree of a country‟s human development has largely been measured by the 
HDI, which focuses on levels of life expectancy, educational attainment, political 
stability and income. Furthermore, by taking health, knowledge and gender indices 
into account, development strategies have supposedly been designed to shift their 
focus on improving these spheres so as to work towards higher levels of human 
development.  
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Development practitioners have for the past decades taken cognisance of the 
fact that poverty manifests in different forms, including powerlessness, lack of social 
capital and, at times, the inability of the poor to access state resources that could 
potentially work to their benefit. The measurements essentially fall short in providing 
an analysis of the micro-level reality in the areas in which they are applied. For the 
purposes of this study, the definition of poverty as articulated by the World Summit 
on Social Development in Copenhagen is useful:  
 
Poverty has various manifestations, including lack of income and productive 
resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill 
health; limited or lack of access to education and other basic services; increased 
morbidity and mortality from illness; homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe 
environments and social discrimination and exclusion. It is also characterized by a 
lack of participation in decision-making and in civil, social and cultural life. … 
Absolute poverty is a condition characterized by severe deprivation of human needs, 
including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and 
information. It depends not only on income but also on access to services (UNDP, 
1995). 
 
4.2. Presentation of Data 
 
4.2.1. Economic Growth and FDI  
 
 Mozambique is ranked as one of the poorest countries in the world according 
to UNDP and WFP statistics. Since the end of the war, economic growth has re-
surged, averaging 7 percent between 2000 and 2008 (See Figure 1). Growth reached 
an all-time high of 11.9 percent in 2001. Figure 2 suggests that economic growth has 
been in tandem with higher FDI inflows. Between 1998 and 2003 FDI net inflow 
increased by a substantial 36 percent, with the highest figure of US$381.7 million 
recorded in 1999. Although there was a decrease in subsequent years (20042006), 
the economy continued to grow, registering an annual GDP growth rate of 8 percent 
in 2006. 
 
Steady growth has been a result of the restructuring of State Owned 
Enterprises (SoE) and government‟s promotion of policies that are conducive to 
increased levels of FDI. FDI inflows have also been volatile. Between 2003 and 2005 
there was a sharp decline. In 2003, total FDI was US$336.7 million. The figure 
continued to decline: in 2004 and 2005, inflows recorded US$244.7 million and 
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US$107.9 million respectively. Although there is a small increase in 2006 of 
US$153.7 million, it is still below the inflows recorded in 1999, which stood at 
US381.7 million. Despite an FDI growth led economy, hunger remains a stark fact of 
life for large numbers of households. This phenomenon, however, hides behind 
progress made in recent years toward sustainable food security.  
 

















Source: World Development Indicators Online (2008). Available at: 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0FSM7AQ40. 
 






























Source: World Development Indicators Online (2008). Available at: 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0FSM7AQ40. 
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4.2.2. Mozambique‟s Food Security Success Story?  
 
Mozambique has registered significant changes in food production. Figure 3, 
below, illustrates that total cereal production and per capita calorie availability from 
cereals have increased substantially since the end of war in 1992. Forecast production 
in 1996/97 was more than double that of 1989/90 and 25% higher than 1995/96. In the 
period that Mozambique experienced the highest levels of economic growth, cereal 
production simultaneously increased. Figure 3, however, notes that there was a small 
decrease in production between 1999 (1,912 metric tons) and 2001 (1,585 metric 
tons). This may be a result of devastating floods in 2000. The post-flood years 
witnessed a resurgence of cereal production from 1,662 Metric Tonnes in 2003 to 
1,922 in 2005.  
 
The last figure of production recorded in 2007 was at 1454 metric tons. This 
meant that by 2007 Mozambique produced 1,212 tonnes more than the initial 
production in 1992 (242 metric tons). War had disrupted government‟s expenditures 
on agricultural production, however, post-conflict stability enhanced agricultural 
production. Overall, Figure 3 illustrates that there was a substantial increase of 83 
percent in cereal production, ensuring Food Security in Mozambique and the 
availability of food. However, food access has become a problem in Mozambique. 
Food is only made available through market mechanisms, leaving the poor and 
vulnerable unable to access food. 
 




























Source:  FAOSTAT Online Statistical Service (2009). Available online at: http://www.fao.org. 
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 Figure 4 illustrates that there was a substantial decrease in Food Aid received 
by Mozambique from 921.1 metric tons in 1992 to 80.6 metric tons in 2006. Between 
1992 and 1999 the average Food Aid received was 288.3 metric tons. The lowest 
figure recorded in this period was 84.6 metric tons in 1996. The trend continued to 
register a decline between 2000 and 2006. Average food aid received stood at 153.3 
metric tons in this period. There was a 46.8 percent decrease in food aid received 
between the periods 19921999 and 20002006. The last trends recorded figure of 
Food Aid received in 2006, stood at 80.6 metric tons, an all-time low. Donors and 
international NGOs provided Mozambique with the needed food aid, making the 
country reliant on food aid, however, in 2006, Mozambique was set on a trajectory of 
reducing Food Aid.  
 






















































Source: FAO. FAOSTAT Online Statistical Service (2009). Available online at: http://faostat.fao.org/. 
 
In the post-conflict phase Mozambique was thus able to reduce reliance on 
food aid and boost agricultural production, which subsequently determined food 
security in the country. Progress in food security in recent years was evident in three 
areas: 1) increasing per capita calorie availability in the face of dramatic reductions in 
food aid; 2) lowering Food Aid received between 1992 and 2006; and 3) developing a 
food supply system which now provides consumers with a broad range of low-cost 
staples from which to choose. However, the number of chronically hungry has not 
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substantially increased. Between 1991 and 2006 the rural population living in poverty 
constituted 55.3% of the population. Although, food has been readily available in 
cities, both the rural and urban poor chronically face food shortages. This could be a 
result of the factors that will be illustrated in the tables below.  
 
Although the availability of food over the past decade has improved, Food 
Security is still an issue in Mozambique. Table 1 illustrates that indices of chronic 
malnutrition are still extremely high; at 41 percent of children under the age of 5. This 
is an alarming percentage, because it means that approximately 1.3 million children 
are chronically malnourished. Although the extent of poverty fell from 69.4 percent to 
54.1 percent between 1997 and 2003, the extent of malnutrition, in terms of 
percentage of underweight children under the age of five, is still high; 24% of 
population, as Table 1 further suggests.  
 
PARPA II notes that rates of malnutrition did not improve significantly 
between 2001 and 2003 (down 2.3 percent). Rural areas saw a decline of 3.6 percent, 
while in urban areas, there was a 0.4 percent increase of the percentage of 
underweight children (PARPA, 2006: 63). The report further notes that the overall 
objective of government reads: “Between 1990 and 2009, the percentage of the 
Mozambican population that suffers hunger and chronic malnutrition (transitory and 
structural food and nutritional insecurity) reduced by 30 percent (PARPA, 2006: 63). 
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Table 1: Mozambique‟s Children‟s Health Indicators Over a Period of Time  
 
Indicator  Period Period  Period Year 
 1970-1990 1990-2007 2000-2007 2007 
U-5 Mortality 
(%) 




-- -- 24 -- 
U-5 Stunting 
(%) 












-- -- -- 87 
 
Sources: Food Security Statistics, 2008. Available on-line at 
http://www.fao.org/es/ess/faostat/foodsecurity/index_en.htm.   Monitoring the Situation of Children 
and Women (2008).  Available online at: http://www.childinfo.org/. 
(--) Indicates that data is not available  
 
Despite an extensive coverage of immunisations, as illustrated by Table 1 (TB 
87%, Measles 77%, and Polio 70%, in 2007), children that survive diseases are faced 
with the reality of hunger. Infant mortality has substantially decreased in 
Mozambique, standing at 115 out of 1000 in 2007; however, it remains high 
compared to low-income countries such as Malawi at 71 out of 1000 in 2007 and a 
post-conflict society like Rwanda at 109 out of 1000 in 2007
13
. Both Tables 1 and 2 
illustrate that hunger is still a problem in Mozambique. A decrease in infant mortality 
is marked by a rate of 1.6 percent between 1970 and 1990. Data for subsequent years 
are missing, however, the rate of reduction continues to decrease at 1.1 percent 
between 1990 and 2007. By 2015, the infant mortality rate is forecast at 25% higher, 
                                                 
13
 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). 2008. The State of the World's Children 2009: Maternal 
and Newborn Health. Table 1. New York: UNICEF. Available online at: 
http://www.unicef.org/sowc09/index.php. 
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and life expectancy will have declined from 42 to 36 years rather than increasing to 50 
years as targeted by the Government of Mozambique (GoM). 
 
Table 2: Mozambique‟s Nutrition Levels  
Indicator  Period Period Period 
 1990-1992 1995-1997 2003-2005 
 %Population that 
is Undernourished  
59 52 38 
 
Source:  The State of the World's Children 200. Available online at: 
http://www.unicef.org/sowc09/index.php. 
 
In similar vein, Table 2 records a substantial decrease of population that is 
undernourished between 1990 and 2005. There was a substantial decrease of 27 
percent between the periods 19951997 and 20032005. However, this meant that in 
2005, close to 38 percent of the population were undernourished, which was almost 
6,000,000 people, of which 41% were children. National indicators are still 
significantly below those presented by Mozambique‟s peer group, particularly the 
maternal mortality rate of 1000 deaths per 100,000 people in 2000 and 3 physicians 
per 100, 000 people, as illustrated by Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Mozambique‟s Public Health Indicators  
Indicator Period Period 
 1990-2007 2000 
Physicians per 
100, 000 people  
3 -- 
Maternal deaths 
per 100, 000 
births 
-- 1000  
 
Sources: Global Health Atlas 2009.  Available online at: http://www.who.int/globalatlas/. 
 
The relationship between hunger and other social indicators, such as, health is 
important. First, reduced hunger increases learning and lowers levels of malnutrition, 
which improve human capital and lead to greater economic growth. Second, learning 
reduces hunger, which increases participation in the labour force and improves the 
efficiency of workers, thereby contributing to economic growth. With 41 percent of 
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children undernourished, hunger has restricted learning opportunities for infants (i.e. 
access and utilisation) and has impaired future capacity to learn (i.e. utilisation of 
future learning opportunities).  
 
This has meant that Mozambican children‟s cognitive foundation for acquiring 
future skills and knowledge to address hunger has been undermined. In Mozambique, 
hunger limits opportunities to learn by reducing attendance in school and making it 
hard to concentrate. Hunger has also damaged the future capacity of children affected 
to learn by preventing catch-up growth. Reduced learning at this stage further 
weakens the foundation for acquiring skills and knowledge to address hunger (i.e. to 
improve the availability, access and utilisation of nutrients). Furthermore, hunger has 
also prevented children from acquiring some skills related to nutrition and health (i.e. 
utilisation of nutrients) that can be applied immediately.   
 
 It is noted that despite significant progress in increasing food production in 
Mozambique, the relationship between food production, hunger and poverty reduction 
remains complex. In the medium- and long-term, food security in Mozambique will 
increasingly depend on improvements in agricultural productivity. As a MAP report 
suggested: “This improved productivity will require substantial investment in its 
research and extension systems, and in a private sector input distribution system able 
to facilitate farmer use of yield increasing input” (MAP, 1996). Despite investments 
by donors and the government, the country‟s agricultural research and extension 
system is exceptionally weak. As Mozambique strives to increase food production, 
thousands of children remain trapped. This has meant that both the urban and rural 
poor have had to depend on manufactured agricultural products, as they are dependent 
on markets for the purchase of foodstuffs. As the UN in Mozambique notes: 
 
Taking into account the fact that rural households spend 60 - 65% of their average 
income on their food, and as this expenditure is higher and the food reserves lower in 
households with low food consumption, projections indicate that the situation of 
nutrition and food security, particularly with regard to quality of diet, will deteriorate 
due to price increases of basic products that have been witnessed in recent years, with 
a tendency for this to be aggravated due to the oil crisis and the reduction of foodstuff 




4.2.3. Mozambique‟s Human Development  
 
The Human Development Index was developed to provide composite 
measurements of economic growth and development. As the UNDP report suggests, 
the:  
 
HDI index is not in any sense a comprehensive measure of human development. It 
does not, for example, include important indicators such as gender or income 
inequality nor more difficult to measure concepts like respect for human rights and 
political freedoms. What it does provide is a broadened prism for viewing human 
progress and the complex relationship between income and well-being (2009).  
 
Figure 5 below demonstrates that Mozambique‟s HDI since 1980 improved 
substantially. Between 1980 and 2007, Mozambique‟s HDI rose from 0.280 to 0.402. 
In the initial decade of post-conflict peace settlement between 1990 and 2000, the 
HDI averaged 0.31 compared to the last figure recorded in 1980, at 0.280. Between 
2000 and 2007, HDI averaged 0.384. Post-conflict peace settlement provided an 
impetus for growth and the economic and political stability that was needed for the 
country to move forward. In almost two decades of post-conflict peace, HDI average 
growth rose by 22.5 percent. The highest recorded figure was in 2007, which was 
0.402. Mozambique, however, did not improve positions on global rankings. The 
country maintained its position 172 between 2006 and 2007, raising doubts on the 
post-conflict success story. However, the post-conflict political economy provided the 
impetus for government to raise revenue for social services such as healthcare, 




































Source: Human Development Report 2009.Available online at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009/ 
 
Figure 6, below, indicates that Mozambique‟s public health expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP increased by 15.6 percent between 2001 and 2006. The highest 
figure was recorded in 2002, with public health expenditure making up 3.4% of the 
GDP. Although there is a slight decrease between 2003 and 2005, from 2.9% to 2.7%, 
WHO data suggest that between 2003 and 2006 Mozambique‟s health expenditure per 
person increased from US$42 to US$56, which suggests a 33.3% increase
14
. This is 
evidence to suggest that government spending on health continued to rise. Through 
the involvement of international aid partners, government‟s spending on health had 
been increased compared to the war period. Despite increased spending on public 
health, spending was uneven, with some people (i.e. children and the poor) receiving 
little or no share from increased public health expenditure. This was explained in the 
previous section with particular reference to child health and malnutrition. A further 
analysis on diseases such as TB, malaria and HIV/AIDS will shed light on 







                                                 
14
 World Health Organization (WHO). 2006. World Health Report 2006: Annex Table 3. Geneva: 
WHO. Available online at: http://www.who.int/whr/2006/annex/en/index.html and in the WHO 
Statistical Information System (WHOSIS): Core Health Indicators. 
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Source: World Development Indicators Online 2008. Available at: 
http://go.worldbank.org/U0FSM7AQ40.  
 
Figure 7, below, illustrates that tuberculosis incidence rates between 1992 and 
2007 more than doubled by 101.4%. There were 214,000 reported cases of TB when 
peace was brokered in 1992, and this figure substantially rises each year with the 
highest cases reported in 2003 and 2004, recording 455,000 and 460,000, 
respectively. Although there is a minimal decrease from 2005 to 2007 from 455,000 
to 431,000, there were 92,000 estimated new TB cases in Mozambique in 2007. The 
decrease does reach the initial figures recorded in 1992, when the number of reported 
cases stood at 214,000. It is also imperative to note that the years that witnessed a 
slight increase in public health expenditure as a percentage of GDP (2001 and 2003) 
also have the highest number of TB incidence rates at 408,000 and 455,000 
















































Source: Global Health Atlas (2009). Available online at: 
http://www.who.int/globalatlas/dataQuery/default.asp. 
 
Figure 8 illustrates the escalation of Mozambique‟s reported malaria cases. 
The graph illustrates that there were 12,794 cases of malaria reported in 1996. There 
was a big increase, as 194,024 cases were reported in 1998, but the figure is far below 
a million cases. Between 1999 and 2002 the average malaria cases reported jumped to 
3,538,825. There was a substantial increase between 2003 and 2007 of 23 percent; 
figures soared from 4,863,406 in 2003 to 6,327,916 in 2007. The average number of 
reported malaria cases between 2000 and 2007, was 5,106,629. The highest number 
recorded in this period was 6,335,757, in 2006. Figure 8 thus illustrates that there was 
no decrease but that due to poverty and inadequate healthcare facilities figures have 
risen unabatedly. Both UN agencies and PARPA II sources indicate that together 
malaria and TB are the number one causes of death for both rural and urban poor in 
Mozambique. Despite an increase in public health expenditure and health related aid, 
Mozambique‟s public health system remains incapacitated to deal with these two 
pandemics.    
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Source: Global Health Atlas 2009. Available online at: http://www.who.int/globalatlas/. 
 
Latest estimates indicate an HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate of 12% and 
510,000 children orphaned in 2005, as illustrated by Figure 9. Although the last 
recorded number in 2007 shows a reduction to 400,000, the burden of orphans is a 
reality. Mozambique is among the top ten sub-Saharan African countries that have 
been hardest hit by HIV/AIDS, with 1.3 million adults infected. The demographic, 
social and economic consequences of AIDS are of major concern. The cost of 
HIV/AIDS impact to the economy is estimated at approximately 1 percent of GDP 
growth per year. Orphaned children in Mozambique are faced with complexities that 
are borne because of the disease. Before parents die, orphans are forced to bear the 
economic brunt as household expenditure is mainly targeted at meeting healthcare 
needs. Orphans in Mozambique will most likely drop out of school and face the social 
stigma that is associated with the pandemic. In addition to lack of healthcare, most 

































Source:  Report on the global AIDS epidemic 2008. 
Available online at 
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Global_report.asp. 
 
In Mozambique, HIV is the main reason for failure to meet TB control targets 
in high HIV settings. TB is a major cause of death among people living with 
HIV/AIDS. Despite an increase in public health expenditure in Mozambique, the 
government has not effectively managed the outbreak of both TB and HIV/AIDS. 
There is an important link when malaria is added to the equation, as all three require a 
substantial decrease of poverty to create livable social environments. Collaborative 
TB/HIV activities have the objectives of creating the mechanism of collaboration 
between TB and HIV/AIDS programmes, reducing the burden of TB among People 
Living with HIV/AIDS (PLHIV) and reducing the burden of HIV among TB patients, 
and thereby the number of OVC. A post-conflict success story would thus have 
sought to mitigate the reality of deadly epidemics, such as malaria, TB, and 
HIV/AIDS, which have altered Mozambique‟s social structure.   
 
4.2.4. Poverty and Economic Development  
 
Figure 10, below, has two variables tracing total aid given by OECD and DAC 
countries. The graphs illustrate that Mozambique has continued to be aid-dependent 
since a SAP programme was agreed upon with international stakeholders, such as the 
IMF and World Bank, in 1987. Aid given by DAC countries increased by 38 percent 
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between 1992 and 2008. In 1992 DAC countries contributed US$797.52 million, 
whereas, in 2008, the figure stood at US$ 1.3 billion. The highest figure was recorded 
in 2002 when total aid given by DAC countries reached US$1.5 billion. Immediately 
after, there was a decrease of almost 30 percent, however, the levels have continued to 
rise since then.  
 
Between 1992 and 1999, almost a decade after the GPA was signed, total 
average aid given to Mozambique stood at US$1.364 billion. In what would be 
considered as the second generation of political and economic reforms during 2000 to 
2008, average total aid given to Mozambique stood at US$1.54 billion. This has 
meant that, in almost two decades, total aid given to Mozambique has increased by 
11.2 percent. In 2008, Mozambique recorded total ODA of US$1.9 billion, an all-time 
high, substantiating the fact that the country has structurally become dependent on 
aid, and aid is mandatory to Mozambique‟s economic growth and sustenance of social 
programmes. Multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the AfDB have 
become major development financiers in Mozambique, providing a conducive 
environment toward multilateral loans and grants. This calls into question the capacity 
of the state to create mechanisms to check donors. Aid-dependency in Mozambique 
has meant that the trajectory of post-conflict economic reforms has been managed by 










































































Source: OECD online Database.  Online 
http://stats.oecd.org/OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=REF_TOTALRECPTS&Show
OnWeb=true&Lang=en   
 
A successful post-conflict story would have reversed these trends. Substantial 
increase in aid should supposedly be targeted toward accumulation of national capital 
to reduce dependence on aid. There is an inherent danger with aid-dependency, as the 
international development architects formulate solutions that are in conflict with the 
Mozambican society development path. While it is desirable to provide a favourable 
environment in which public and private partnerships can flourish to combat poverty, 
aid is not an end it itself. Aid stifles self-reliance, and in this case, self-reliance is not 
autarky. The Mozambican state lacks the bargaining power to channel aid into 
agricultural transformation and to embark on an economic revolution that would run 
contrary to a market society. Self-reliant economies are better placed to chart a new 
developmental path. Efforts by international financial institutions, albeit with good 
intentions, have debilitated a revolution of the economy. Aid needs to be targeted 
towards programmes which stimulate social entrepreneurship and government 
capacity to promote political stability. Aid-dependency in Mozambique and Africa is 
a result of a lack of a shift in ideology. 
 
In past years, prudent monetary and fiscal policies have stabilised the 
economy. The reviews under the three-year Poverty Reduction Growth Facility 
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(PRGF) approved by the IMF in July 2004 have been favorable. As the AfDB notes: 
“Reporting and management of expenditure has improved considerably and the tax 
base has been broadened, increasing fiscal revenues to 13.8 percent of GDP, in 2005” 
(AfDB, 2008). The fiscal deficit (including grants) for 2005 was estimated at 5.6 
percent of GDP, just under the 6 percent target. Nevertheless, additional efforts to 
mobilise tax revenues are necessary in order to reduce dependence on foreign aid. 
Gross national savings averaged 7 percent of GDP between 2003 and 2005, while the 
average annual gross investment rate was 23 percent of GDP, with the gap being 
financed by foreign savings including grants. 
 
Overall, it is expected that the economy will grow at an annual rate of 5 
percent (subject to change due to a global meltdown) in the next few years. It is 
believed that higher GDP targets of 7 or 8 percent can be met if, in addition to sound 
macroeconomic and public finance management, crucial restructuring operations, 
(namely, the second “wave” of reforms and infrastructure investments) are carried 
out. These are essential in order to improve the business environment and, thus, 
promote private sector development that drives economic growth. If these growth 
projections are observed and the inequality indexes remain at historical levels, the 
poverty level will decrease to 31 percent in 2015. However, Mozambique will be an 
economy in which growth is taking place in tandem with income and social 
inequalities, which masks the projections that MDGs can be reached by 2015.  
 
4.2.5. Governance in Mozambique: Corruption  
 
Figure 11, below, illustrates that corruption in Mozambique has increased. The 
graph shows that the highest score recorded on the corruption index was in 2000, 
when it stood at 2.2. Subsequent years from 2003 to 2006 illustrate that the average 
Corruption rate stood at 2.77, meaning that levels of corruption had not changed in 
this period. The Corruption Index was developed by the TI. As pointed out before, the 
CPI measures the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public 
officials and politicians. Ratings range in value from 10 (least corrupt) to 0 (most 
corrupt). The survey measures public sector corruption or the abuse of public office 
for private gain. It measures local and national governments, not domestic and foreign 
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corporations doing business in these countries. Although there has been a slight 
decrease between 1999 and 2002, Mozambique has continued to become a more 
corrupt society. In 2006 the Corruption Perception Index stood at 2.8.  
 






















Source: Corruption Perceptions Index 2006. Available online at: 
http://www.icgg.org/corruption.cpi_olderindices.html. 
 
The anatomy of corruption in Mozambique can be traced to structural 
inheritances from the colonial era and the transition from authoritarian rule to 
democratic rule. Corruption undermines the fight against poverty and the struggle for 
justice and a more fair and equitable society. Democratic governments are supposed 
to serve their constituencies, the electorate. Corruption also undermines the promotion 
of democratic values, and thereby reduces accountability and transparency in the 
political systems. The poor and marginalised in society trust public institutions to 
serve their interests, such as, in health and financial institutions. When trust is 
undermined, it means that democratic participation is curtailed, thereby instilling fear 
in citizens to participate in a democratic society.  
 
Corruption hurts both the development of nascent democratic institutions and 
citizens that are supposed to be served by their government, and the process of 
economic development itself. Corrupt governments become sources of insecurity to 
their citizens. Whereas governments are supposed to work for the people; corruption 
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entrenches elite dominance, especially when grand corruption is considered. Political 
elites can therefore buy justice, as judicial institutions become accountable to the 
interests of elite dominance. The fact that Mozambique has become aid-dependent has 
also paved avenues where corruption has become endemic. Aid-dependency has 
meant that Mozambican officials are accountable to donors, more than to their 
constituencies. It can be argued then that aid has an endemic character of undermining 
the very same constituencies it ought to serve. For example, a USAID report notes the 
following:  
 
More than $100 million of donor funds were used in 2001 to bail out the failed 
privatization of the Commercial Bank of Mozambique (BCM), the purchase of which 
in 1996 was allegedly funded by donors for rehabilitation of the metalworking 
industry. What is clear is that donor funds intended for development often have the 
unintended effect of enriching a small elite of wealthy and politically powerful 
individuals, thus diminishing the overall impact of development assistance. Even 
when donor funds are audited and well-managed, they can serve to free up other 
government funds for misuse by public officials. (2005: 5). 
 
There are inherent problems when governments become predatory and fail to 
reduce corruption. There is no concrete evidence to show whether democratic 
governments are the best vehicles to deliver on development; and development itself 
is a nebulous term. Crucial to note is that social change and progress take place in 
societies that uphold the rule of law and as political interests are aligned to provide the 
social policy goals. In Mozambique, corruption is a complex problem. This can be 
attributed to a parasitic relationship that involves donors, the government, and the 
people. At the top of this chain are donors and the government, who make political 
decisions that have social consequences. Whereas effective policies to reduce social 
ills are supposed to be carried out by the state, the parasite relationship becomes more 
apparent as public and social institutions are incapacitated to make social change 
possible. Corruption thus unmasks Mozambique‟s success story.      
 
4.2.5. Key Findings  
 
Despite the fact that Mozambique has registered phenomenal growth levels in 
the post-conflict years, there are four key findings that this study has noted. This study 
has not attempted to dispute that growth is taking place in Mozambique, however, 
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analytical questions about what encompasses growth need to be carefully looked at. 
The study, thus, notes the following: 
 
Under the auspices of international stakeholders, Mozambique has been able 
to create a favourable environment in which the desperately needed capital can 
finance development. However, this growth has also been accompanied by low 
investment in agriculture and the eradication of poverty and hunger. Although 
Mozambique‟s cereal production has increased in the post-conflict years, this masks 
the higher levels of hunger and malnutrition that are prevalent in both the urban and 
rural areas of Mozambique. Hunger reduction not only remains an important social 
issue but is fundamental to the economic performance and progress of this economy. 
The study has also noted that investment in agricultural production could potentially 
reduce the risks of hunger and poverty in Mozambique, even in the midst of the 
natural disasters that have frequently struck this country.  
 
Despite an increase in public health expenditure and public health per capita, 
malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS have burdened the post-conflict state, altering 
the social structure. As a result of binding international agreements to target the 
reduction of both malaria and tuberculosis, Mozambique‟s incidence rates of both 
epidemics have continued to rise. The two diseases remain the number one causes of 
death in both adults and children, in both urban and rural areas.    
 
Despite an average economic growth rate of 78 percent in the past decade, 
Mozambique continues to be an aid-dependent economy. Because of this, 
Mozambique‟s post-conflict political economy is influenced strongly by powerful 
international stakeholders and private capital. This weakens the state apparatus to 
chart a developmental path that is indigenous.  
 
Despite democratic reforms, corruption is rampant in Mozambican society. 
Corruption has undermined citizens‟ trust of public institutions, as a lack of 
accountability and transparency is encouraged. In Mozambique, corruption is 
exacerbated by the fact that there is a parasitic relationship amongst three 
constituencies, donors, government (state institutions) and the people.  
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4.3. Conclusion  
 
 The end of the Cold War signified the beginning of a new period in global 
affairs. As the world had previously been divided on ideology, the post-Cold War 
period provided a new avenue for peaceful cooperation and a prioritisation of human 
security. When the peace deal was signed in Mozambique, donors and architects of 
the peace process expected that Mozambique would deliver the democratic ideals. 
Years of combat saw the deterioration of socio-economic variables as the government 
became incapacitated to act. In the post-conflict period, economic development was 
supposed to be a mark that Mozambique was moving toward national reconciliation 
and stability. 
 
 Data in this chapter from major International Organisations are used to support 
claims made in the literature review: that Mozambique‟s success story should be 
subjected to criticism. Without dismissing the fact that Mozambique‟s post-conflict 
political economy has made strides toward growth, there are declining social and 
governance indicators. This does not mean that any improvement of these indicators 
would suggest that Mozambique is on a trajectory of development. As the next 
chapter will argue, there need to be new models to question the current status quo of 


















This chapter provides the concluding remarks of the study. The main aim of 
this study is to critically evaluate whether Mozambique‟s post-conflict political 
economy is a success story. Data collected have pointed towards questioning and 
contesting claims that Mozambique is a successful post-conflict society. The study 
found that, despite improvements in reducing the number of people living in poverty 
between 1992 and 2008, malnutrition, diseases, such as, malaria, HIV/AIDS and 
tuberculosis, and corruption are on the increase, demystifying claims that 
Mozambique is a post-conflict success story. Further, the study also found out that 
Mozambique has become structurally dependent on aid, and the country‟s sovereignty 
in policy making has been curtailed.  
 
The study also relied on the importance of history to understand the evolution 
of Mozambique‟s political economy from colonialism, through post-colonial state  
and the advent of war, and finally, democratic reforms and a move toward market 
capitalism. This historical narrative helps to explain the choices and processes of 
change that have shaped Mozambique since the start of its existence. The 
contemporary history has helped explain why a country like Mozambique was 
incorporated into the global capitalist economy. Further, the narrative aims to 
highlight the fact that beyond contemporary dilemmas, Mozambique has gone through 
tumultuous political and economic changes. It is a unique case study in post-colonial 
Africa, yet at the same time shares similarities with other African countries and post-
conflict societies across the world. Mozambique‟s history is shaped by a long 
resistance to colonial capital toward the creation of a free society. However, given 
global demands and the failure of the socialist state, Mozambique acquiesced to the 
current development paradigm.  
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5.1.1. Mozambique: Development in an era of Neo-liberalism? 
 
There are a myriad of factors that have been noted in this study. The study has 
explored the question of whether Mozambique‟s post-conflict political economy is 
„Africa‟s success story‟ of post-conflict reconstruction. Mozambique represents a 
confluence of different strains of political thought and traditions that have shaped this 
country and, specifically, the trajectory of the post-conflict state itself. Historically, 
Mozambique had been a battle ground between the socialist and capitalist blocs, with 
market fundamentalism and democratisation emerging as victors, especially in the 
post-Cold war era. Although Mozambique stands out as a unique case, given its 
tumultuous historical past, this narrative helps to explain the trajectory that most 
African countries have followed.  
 
Although there have been notable achievements, claims of revolutionary 
success by Mozambique‟s major donors remain suspicious. Since the 1980s, total aid 
given by OECD countries and bilateral and multilateral lending has increased. Given 
that reality, Mozambique has become an aid-dependent economy, registering current 
account deficits between 2000 and 2009. The major reason is that the development 
model promoted by the BWI is counter-intuitive. Donor governments and the leading 
development agencies have not proposed a development plan that envisions a 
„Mozambique beyond aid‟.  
 
The development model relies on recycling knowledge that does not promote 
self-reliance. Donors are content with the status, albeit critical of governance 
indicators like corruption. Although there has been a substantial decrease of the 
number of people living in poverty since the end of the war, inequality and 
malnutrition and corruption have increased in the post-conflict state. The return of 
peace also signified the stabilisation of society and families. This has led to flexible 
movements between urban and rural dwellers, and families that were not in contact 
during the war.  However, flexible movements have led to the transmission of 
HIV/AIDS and thereby the number of OVCs. Despite an increase of development aid 
to combat HIV/AIDS by donors, state structures are incapacitated to deal with the 
pandemic. 
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Any attempt therefore, to understand the present-day conditions in 
Mozambique resonates well with the deeper realities that most African countries are 
experiencing. Portuguese colonial rule left a legacy of blight and neglect for 
Mozambican citizens, as they were treated as subjects and subservient to the interests 
of empire. This void was filled by the political maneuvering of the FRELIMO party, 
especially under the leadership of Samora Machel. Although the country forged 
nationhood before statehood, the contestations that are found in virtually all African 
states surfaced, leading to the conflict itself. In doing so, the democratic socialist 
revolution was not given a chance to flourish, as it faced internal and external threats. 
Eventually, market fundamentalism as an alternative to socialist progress, created a 
myth of progress and change, a reality that is still felt in Mozambique‟s post-conflict 
phase. This analysis helps us to understand that Mozambique‟s contestations and 
negotiations to chart its developmental path is an experience that most African 
countries have also had to negotiate. The challenge, as has been argued by Elicio 
Macamo, is that  
 
[t]he claim that development is desirable in Africa because the continent lacks 
development is circular in nature. Since dire political, social, and economic 
conditions describe the condition of nondevelopment, doing away with them does not 
explain why Africa should develop, but rather restates the problem. The practice of 
development aid, however, has shown that the real explanation for the development 
claim is not the nondevelopment of Africa. It is rather geopolitical and strategic 
interests pursued by those who provide aid. The question which African countries 
have to address is whether such interests are consistent with their own nation-
building efforts. (2005: 5-6) 
 
 Throughout the twentieth century and at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, there have been myriad debates on development progress and change. 
Various questions have been asked about what the idea of development is and what 
the necessary conditions that foster developmental processes are. This study has 
suggested that the current status quo of global development needs to be questioned. If 
we are to understand development in Africa, then Africans need to formulate a post-
colonial idea of development. For other scholars, the idea of development conjures up 
images of colonial regimes which developed the intellectual and social capital of 
cities to the neglect of rural areas. This is not to suggest that change does not 
constitute a greater part of the development agenda. However, it is political and 
intellectual hubris to suggest that there is a blueprint plan for solving the problems 
that have been bequeathed by colonialism, imperialism, failure of the post-colonial 
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state and lately, development models from Washington. I, thus, agree with Stiglitz‟s 
point that if there is a consensus today about what strategies are most likely to 
promote the development of the poorest countries in the world, the only consensus is 
that the Washington Consensus failed (2008: 41).  
 
 The African Development Bank notes that Mozambique has met the criteria 
for eligibility to the "fast track" status under the MDGs.  
 
The MDGs likely to be achieved are income poverty, hunger, child mortality and 
maternal health. Fast progress towards the remaining MDGs targets requires major 
policy and institutional reforms and significant financial and human resources (2009).  
  
Of crucial concern is that policy and institutional reforms are not indigenous 
and thus fail to mobilise social change and raise a critical mass. What is desperately 
needed in Mozambique and the continent is a new developmental model that takes 
into account of Africa‟s contextual realities. In the pages below I shall suggest what 
may characterise that dialogue, however, I revert to the central theoretical framework 
of this thesis.    
 
Both Ake and Mafeje saw beyond the constraints of the liberal international 
regime that was incapable of change. It needed a different generation of Africans to 
challenge the current status quo of the world‟s international political economy, as a 
move toward the articulation of self-reliance seemed inevitable. The need for this 
contestation is further expressed by a lament of the first African UN Secretary 
General who expressed disdain on the paralysis of the BWI and global governance. 
Boutro-Boutros Ghali notes the following: 
 
The neoliberal globalization paradigm that has spread across the world has also 
invaded the UN. It has steadily undermined the organisation‟s development mission, 
and its role in questioning and trying to address what developing countries consider 
to be an unjust and inequitable world economic order. Power and action have shifted 
to the BWIs and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). These are organizations in 
which democratic values do not count for much in decision policy-making. The 
underlying objective of these institutions is to support the status quo, not to be critical 
of it (Ghali, 2009: xxiv).  
 
 Ideas of self-reliance espoused by Ake and Mafeje‟s are dismissed in and 
sidelined as a dead socialist project in neo-liberal debates. These ideals however, are 
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rooted in the unyielding beliefs that societies are capable of change. These ideals have 
also found frequent expression from Pan-Africanist scholars, such as Samir Amin, 
who has vehemently argued that an alternative development can only occur when the 
global political order has been changed. Cognisant of the importance of institutional 
reforms, he also notes that reform should be accompanied by a heightened political 
role of the UN. However, Amin differs with most theorists, as he suggests that 
 
[t]he deployment of revolutionary development demands deep political changes in 
every part of the world, the replacement of existing hegemonic social alliances (based 
on the domination comprador capitalism in the peripheries of the South and now the 
East) with different social alliances based on the hegemony of labour and the popular 
classes (1997: 42)  
 
Crucial to note is that Nobel Prize laureate, Joseph Stiglitz‟s, influential 
Globalisation and its Discontents (2001) made no reference to the plight of African 
economies and the challenges that burden these countries. On the other hand, 
Dambisa Moyo‟s ambitious project, Dead Aid (2008), provided answers that sought to 
challenge the aid predicament in Africa without dismantling the current status quo of 
development in the world. The rhetoric of moving beyond the Washington Consensus 
is couched in a framework that is comfortable with entrenching values that are 
promoted by the BWI institutions. Development thus becomes an instrumental tool 
for change insofar as Washington dictates. This is equally naïve and intellectual 
hubris that should be challenged. Furthermore, change, and in this case developmental 
change, takes place in a vacuum of democratic contestations.  
 
Any discussion on charting the way forward through the development impasse 
that Africa and a country like Mozambique face should deconstruct the development 
discourse. There needs to be a shift towards a post-colonial development discourse. 
This move should take cognisance of global governance reforms which speak to the 
realities of a political crisis of the whole continent of Africa, and the citizens of 
Mozambique. A post-colonial development model then should challenge the dominant 
status quo of global capitalism with a recognition that Africa is marred by a political 
crisis. If development is understood that aid provides an impetus for growth and 
meeting short-term goals, then neo-liberal claims that political and economic growth 
has been revolutionary in Mozambique are correct. However, Mozambique and Africa 
are heterogeneous places; and development is a mystery that has not been unlocked to 
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deal with political and governance complexities. This needs to be determined by the 
political leadership of each country, with a move to address local grievances of the 
people. Authoritarian politics are a legacy of colonialism, and its remnants are still felt 
in most African countries that are democratising.  
 
Although Mozambique and most countries in Africa have democratised, little 
has changed to bind the local grievances with a political system that ensures social 
justice and equity. There is a deep suspicion in contemporary Africa‟s political 
intellectual tradition that frowns on ideas that promote the ideas of social justice, due 
to an accommodation and contentment with the status quo. In this instance, politics 
thus becomes a means to an end. Revolutionary development in Mozambique or 
Africa can only take place when political institutions and thoughts are challenged to 
pioneer a development path that reflects post-colonial realities. What is needed, 
therefore, is politics that root out fear and cynicism, cognisant of a development of a 
social democracy that mends fragile social indicators like health and education, as 
Ake, Amin, and Mafeje have all argued. In this light, the contestation involves both 
national and global institutions, and a recognition that Africa should not be paralysed 
by its past. Africa‟s past therefore becomes a reference point to move toward politics 
of compassion.   
 
Further, the question that most analysts fail to address is to see Africa, or 
rather a country like Mozambique, as it is. As Ridell has argued: 
 
Many poor countries have been ill served by the rigidity and narrowness of much of 
the macro-level policy advice coming from the leading IFIs, which have proved 
inadequate to address their complex, structural and long term development problems 
(2007: 254).  
 
Could it be that at the core of this misunderstanding of the effectiveness of aid 
in a place like Mozambique is that it is misguided by a disjunctured global partnership 
and the failure of the liberal international regime? Aid regimes then need to tie their 
efforts with the broader grievances of self-reliance, and as Riddell once again argues, 
a recognition “that while often valuable and important in the short term, much official 
development aid has not done much lasting good: there have been huge gaps between 
expectations and achievements” (2007: 254). 
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Mozambique‟s post-conflict development takes place at a unique place in 
history. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, world leaders committed 
themselves to ridding the globe of the scourges of war, poverty and deprivation. In 
1987, Mozambique became part of the World Bank, as the non-aligned movement had 
failed to provide the logistical and financial support that was needed to sustain the 
democratic socialist revolution. A peace settlement between FRELIMO and 
RENAMO ensured that Mozambique embarked on a new path. This study analysed 
data, specifically looking at social and governance indicators suggesting that 
Mozambique is not a success story. The study analysed poverty, malnutrition and 
hunger, and health indicators and macroeconomic data to demystify claims that 
Mozambique is a success story.  
 
The colonial period deserves attention because its legacy lives on in 
contemporary Mozambique. It continues in the stamped paper that must be purchased 
and completed before a contract can be signed or a foreigner can get a visa. It lives on 
in the way that agrarian relations are structured from the land that is allocated for 
growing particular crops to the allocation of land for those who grow a hectare or 
more of cotton in the belt. As Pitcher has suggested:  
 
Agriculture exports such as cashew, tea, sugar, and cotton can be traced to the 
colonial period, and most textile, beverage, flour, beer, and cement factories were not 
built ten or twenty years ago under the FRELIMO government, but thirty of forty 
years ago under the Portuguese (2002: 15).  
 
A closer examination of Mozambique‟s post-conflict political economy 
reveals structural legacies bequeathed by colonialism and FRELIMO‟s one-party rule 
between 1975 and 1992. As a result of a negotiated democratic transition, FRELIMO 
won the elections in 1994 and has subsequently continued to win convincingly with 
questionable results. This political space has been filled with the rhetoric of 
contestation as RENAMO has attempted to position itself as a robust opposition. 
However, democratisation enhances participation and citizenship. Democratic 
participation entrenches democratic institutions through which citizens are given the 
voices to participate in the future direction of Mozambique. Both Mafeje and Ake, 
with every prophetic insight, warned that for African countries to move forward, 
democratic decentralisation should be the cornerstone of development policies.  
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 The study also notes that politically, democratic reforms have not led to the 
changes envisaged. FRELIMO has dominated the nascent democratic institutions, 
positioning itself as the vanguard of democracy, whilst the populace remains 
alienated. Economically, Mozambique remains an aid-dependent economy. Donors 
have taken a genuine interest in developing a competitive Mozambique and have 
refrained from questioning some of the contradictions and paradoxes that characterise 
the success story. The rule of law is absent, as corruption has curtailed the growth of 
nascent democratic institutions. This has had an impact on the poor and vulnerable in 
Mozambique; because the poor have so little resources, their prospects of influencing 
the allocation of public resources are limited by a corrupt regime. As Heymans and 
Lipietz suggest, poor people become primary victims of corruption as they are denied 
services either because resources are moved elsewhere or because corrupt payoffs 
make services unaffordable (1999).   
 
 The study also attempted to question the current development model. The 
study notes that, for revolutionary development to take place, Mozambique should 
envision a „Mozambique Beyond Aid‟, where a developmental state will be 
entrenched to drive developmental initiatives. At present, Mozambique remains a 
fragile peace agreement, and this places a question on whether growth has been 
accompanied by equity. Societies are products of socio-political change and this 
merits a re-emphasis that the current neo-liberal paradigm has failed to address the 
plight of Mozambique. Further, any change needs to take into account that 
Mozambique, like most African countries, is marred by a political crisis.   
  
 In spite of this historical account, this study also notes that the political 
economy of Mozambique should not be written as a narrative of a poor country 
overrun by imperialism, globalism, capitalism or any other -ism. States and social 
actors have relative autonomy. As Pitcher has argued, states have room to maneuver 
and some choices they can exercise, but their interactions take place in a context that 
has been delineated by past experiences (2002: 18). The international perspective 
needs to be complemented by a focus on internal or domestic factors that may have 




 This study noted two important developments. Firstly, peacebuilding in 
Mozambique aimed at restoring state sovereignty, ending all large-scale violence and 
initiating a gradual process of democratisation. This process has been riddled with 
inconsistencies, as FRELIMO has adapted to formal „democratic‟ practices, sidelining 
RENAMO. Secondly, following economic reforms under the auspices of the BWI, 
privatisation and liberalisation have constrained the ability of the ruling party to shape 
economic policy and have allowed powerful private actors to dominate particular 
sectors and to determine patterns of production (Pitcher, 2002). Yet, state interests 
have not been completely reduced. The state has not been revolutionised, as neo-
liberal theorists would argue. Conflicts of interest between and within the state 
processes abound, but have interacted with the state administration in discrete ways. 
Positive economic growth inherently remains the greatest threat to peace. The 
marketisation policies that were part of post-conflict peacebuilding have exacerbated 
long-standing socio-economic divisions and distributional inequalities between the 
wealthy elite and the manipulated rural peasantry. This has raised profound 
implications on the long-term sustainability of the peace deal and the well-being of 
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